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IV,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Respondent/Appellee, Lynda Wood ("Lynda" or "Respondent")
responds to an Appeal by Petitioner/Appellant, Neil R. Mitchell
("Neil" or "Petitioner"), and cross-appeals from part of the
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, entered by the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on June 30, 1995. Jurisdiction is proper
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1953 as amended).

V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

If a personal representative under a will fails

to carry out the express terms of the will by neglecting to
establish a trust, but follows the grantor's intent by disbursing
money in accordance with the terms of the trust, is the personal
representative, or her estate, liable to the residuary
beneficiaries under the will?
2.

(Issue preserved at R. 435-440) .

If a personal representative breaches her

fiduciary duty to form a trust, but the residuary beneficiaries
receive the same amount of money, so that no actual damages
result, is the personal representative, or her estate, liable in
any amount to the residuary beneficiaries?

(Issue preserved at

R. 445-447, 511-512) .
3.

Was the Trial Court correct in ruling that

personal representative fees charged against the Grantor's estate
were not cash deficiencies in the Grantor's estate, but were
1

reasonable allowances for the personal representative?

(Issue

preserved at R. 387, 511-512).
4.

Did the Trial Court correctly interpret language

in the will entitling the beneficiary to proceeds from an estate
"as is necessary" for her health, support and maintenance to mean
the beneficiary need not deplete her own estate before accessing
funds from the Grantor's estate?

(Issue preserved at R. 435-437,

511-512).
5.

Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the sole

intestate heir and beneficiary of an estate was not entitled to
the proceeds of a personal injury suit settled after the
Grantor's death?

(Issue preserved at R. 447-448, 512-513).

Because the issues raised in this cross-appeal were
summarily decided on Motions for Summary Judgement, they are
questions of law.

Accordingly, this Court should afford the

Trial Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law no
deference and should review them de novo for correctness.

See

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).

VI.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

Lynda Wood submits that the following authorities are
controlling and entitle her to judgment as a matter of law:
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-201, 75-3-101, 75-3-711, 78-11-12,

2

RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 24(e)
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501

CASES
The issues presented in this appeal are ones of first
impression for this Court.

Lynda Wood therefore submits that the

following persuasive cases are determinative:

First National Bank v. Finkbiner. 416 P.2d 224 (Wyo.
1966) (trustee's instruction to invade principal of trust created
by husband for wife "as may be necessary for her proper care and
support" did not require the wife to exhaust her assets before
payments could be made).

Godfrey v. Chandler, 811 P.2d 1248 (Kan. 1991) (trustee's
instruction to pay beneficiary so much as is necessary for his
support and maintenance raises an inference that beneficiary
receive support from the trust, regardless of other income).

Estate of Lindaren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994) (trust
created to provide for settlor's wife's necessary support, care
and health was liable for wife's nursing home, burial and funeral
expenses notwithstanding wife's personal assets).
3

The issue presented in this cross-appeal is one of first
impression for this Court.

Lynda Wood therefore further submits

that the following persuasive case is determinative:

Behm's Estate v. Gee. 213 P.2d 657 (Utah 1950) (wrongful
death statute providing that action may be maintained by
decedent's intestate heirs held that the proceeds from the
wrongdoer should not be intermingled with the other assets of the
deceased's estate).

4

VII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This case involves a claim against the estate of Marjorie

S. Sims, the former personal representative of her husband, G.
Grant Sims7 estate, who acted according to the substance and
intent of her husband's will, though not in strict accordance as
to the form.

Neil Mitchell, as Successor Personal Representative

of the Estate of G. Grant Sims, filed a claim against the Estate
of Marjorie S. Sims, a probate proceeding pending in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, under
Probate No. 933900278 ES. Marjorie was the Personal
Representative of Grant's Estate under the terms of Grant's Last
Will and Testament (attached as Addendum "C").

(A copy of

Marge's Last Will and Testament is attached at Addendum "B").
Under the Will, Marjorie was to fund a generation
skipping trust after probate and Neil was to serve with her as
Co-Trustee.

Marjorie was the only principal beneficiary of this

Trust and was to receive, without condition, income from the
Trust and so much of the principal as was necessary for her
health, support and maintenance in the standard to which she had
been accustomed during Grant's lifetime.

Marjorie did not fund

the Trust, but withdrew funds from Grant's Estate which she used
for her health, support and maintenance, in accordance with the
express terms of the Will and the Trust.

Thus, Marjorie's

withdrawals did no damage to the residuary value to be received
5

by the beneficiaries of Grant's Trust.
Additionally, Marjorie accepted the proceeds from a
$50,000.00 Certificate of Deposit totalling $52,875.40 with
interest to satisfy a claim she had filed in Grant's Estate.
After Marjorie7s death, her Personal Representative, Lynda Wood,
admitted early in these proceedings that $48,100.00 of the funds
rightly belonged to Grant's Estate and offered that amount to
Neil.

The difference between $52,875.40 and the offer of

$48,100.00 was due to Marge's claim for $1913.02 in personal
representative fees and $2,875.40 in interest on the CD, which
the trustees were required to pay Marjorie.
Finally, Marjorie also accepted a settlement in the
amount of $12,445.86 from a personal injury suit involving Grant
as she was his only surviving intestate heir.

Marge had paid

most of the medical bills Grant incurred as a result of the
injury so her claim against his estate was justified.
On May 8, 1993, Neil filed a claim against Marjorie's
Estate in the amount of $149,509.26 for cash deficiency in
Grant's Estate which Lynda Wood denied on or about August 18,
1993.

Neil then filed a Petition and First Amended Petition for

Allowance of Claim, alleging that Marjorie breached her fiduciary
duty under the Grant's Will and misappropriated his estate funds.

6

B.

Course of Proceedings Below
Neil moved the Trial Court for summary judgment on his

claim against Marjorie's estate.
judgment denying Neil's claim.

Lynda then moved for summary

After oral argument, the Trial

Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting both Neil's and
Lynda's Motions for Summary Judgment in part and denying both in
part.

(The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision is attached at

Addendum "D").
Neil filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court on July 19,
1995, appealing from the part of the Trial Court's Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment (the "Order" which is attached as
Addendum "E") that denied part of Neil's Motion and granted part
of Lynda's Motion.

Lynda filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on these

matters on July 31, 1995, appealing the part of the Trial Court's
Order that denied part of Lynda's Motion for Summary Judgment and
granted part of Neil's Motion.

C.

Disposition at the Trial Court
By its own terms, the Trial Court's Order was deemed a

final judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
54(c) .

7

VIII.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

G. Grant Sims ("Grant") and his wife, Marjorie S. Sims
("Marjorie" or "Marge") had been married for many years and had
enjoyed a healthy and prosperous life together.

R. 406-408.

However, by July 22, 1991, when they executed identical wills,
both Grant and Marge were in their early 80's, confined to their
home by age and declining health, and were bedridden.
409.

R. 406-

Both relied on home nurses for much of their care. R.

406-409.

Still, they enjoyed a comfortable life. When they

could not prepare their own meals, they had dinners delivered
from expensive restaurants.
various civic causes.

R. 406-408.

They contributed to

R. 406-408. And they paid for nurses'

assistance in their home.

R. 406-408.

Grant and Marge were of sufficient wealth at the time
they executed their wills that they were concerned about
incurring large Federal Estate taxes.

R. 409-411. Grant hired

an estate tax specialist, Brett Paulsen, Esq., to review his will
to confirm that the trust provisions would reduce their taxes
without minimizing Marge's financial stability.

R. 409-411.

Grant's Will named Marge as his Personal Representative
and named Petitioner Neil R. Mitchell ("Neil" or "Petitioner"),
Neil's mother Elena Mitchell, and Respondent Lynda Wood ("Lynda"
or "Respondent") as remaindermen.

R. 2 71-274.

Further, Grant's

Will contained provisions for Marge's care and for disbursing his
estate.

R. 270-279. Marge's original will contained identical
8

provisions.

Appellant's Br. at 29.

In addition, Grant's Will

called for a testamentary trust, named "The George Grant Sims
Estate Tax Bypass Trust" ("the Trust") and appointed Marge as cotrustee along with Neil, who was not a lineal relative of
Grant's, but was Marge's nephew.

R. 7, 49, 271-77.

On November

14, 1991, Grant died, leaving his Last Will and Testament ("the
Will").

R. 61, 117, 270. About one year after Grant's death,

Marge signed the final accounting of his Estate and therein
proposed to disburse the residue to Neil and the other
remaindermen.

R. 258-259.

The Will's trust provisions provided that Marge was to
fund the Trust with the residue of Grant's Estate after she paid
his creditors.

R. 258, 271-272. Marge and Neil were to serve as

co-trustees in administering the Trust.

R. 271-272. The trust

provisions in the Will mandated that Marge was to get the income
from the Trust without condition and that "the trustee shall also
distribute as much of the principal as is necessary for her
proper health, support, and maintenance and to maintain her in
the standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's]
lifetime."

R. 272. After Marge's death, the remaining Trustee

was directed to make two specific gifts of $10,000.00 from the
Trust to each of Grant's doctors, Donald E. Smith, MD, and Mark
Muir, MD.

R. 272. After all Marge's medical and living expenses

had been paid from the income and principal of the Trust and the
gifts made to Grant's doctors, the remaining Trust corpus, if
9

any, was to be distributed to the remaindermen.

R. 272.

During the time Marge served as Personal Representative
for Grant's Estate, the Trust was not funded.

R. 398, 511.

Marge was over 82 years old, bedridden and confined to her home.
R. 392, 406-408.

She was in constant need of in-house nursing

care due to her age and poor health.

R. 392, 406-408.

Though she did not form the Trust, Marge drew checks on
Grant's Estate to pay for her living and medical expenses, as
provided in the Trust ("Checking Account Payments").

R. 383,

398, 511-512. Of the $96,642.55 which Marge withdrew from
Grant's Estate for living expenses, $75,439.15 was used to cover
Marge's extensive but reasonable nursing and medical expenses.
R. 378, 383, 398. She had tried to find less costly medical
care, but could not.

R. 406-408.

The reasonableness of these

expenses was established by uncontested affidavit from Lynda, who
spent extensive amounts of time assisting both Grant and Marge in
their last years.

R. 406-408.

Additionally, Marge accepted a $12,445.86 settlement for
a personal injury suit involving her deceased husband ("Personal
Injury Settlement").

R. 400-402. While Grant was alive he

incurred many medical bills as a result of the personal injury,
though his financial records show he only paid $112.30 in medical
bills.

R. 461. Marge's accounting, however, shows that she paid

$18,943.3 0 out of her own funds for medical expenses, many of
which were designated for Grant be the accounting.
10

R. 462.

Grant died before the suit was settled, so Marge, as Grant's wife
and sole surviving intestate heir, accepted the settlement as
reimbursement for paying his medical costs.

R. 400-402, 460-462.

Also, Marge withdrew $52,875.40 from Grant's Estate by
means other than the estate checking account ("Cash Deficiency").
R. 353-355, 383-84, 387. Part of that amount, $48,100.00, was
wrongfully taken from Grant's Estate.

R. 377, 387, 411, 511-512.

Of the remainder, Marge claimed $2875.40 as income to which she
was entitled without condition under the terms of the Will and
$1900.00 as reasonable Personal Representative fees ("Cash
Deficiency Remainder").

R. 48, 158-159, 384. Originally, Marge

claimed $1913.02 in personal representative fees, but later
reduced the claim to $1900.00, favoring Grant's Estate $13.02.
R. 48, 340, 384. Marge's Estate has offered to repay the balance
of $48,100.00 from the beginning of this case and her estate has
repeated this offer to Neil's attorney.

R. 377-379, 385, 411.

Each time, the offer was either ignored or refused.

R. 411. In

any event, Neil has at times in these proceedings, only asked the
court for $48,100.00 in relief on the Cash Deficiency and has not
stated why a larger amount is now in order.

R. 415.

On September 2, 1992, Marge revoked the will she had
executed at the same time as Grant's Will and drafted a new will
naming Lynda her Personal Representative, deleting Neil as a
beneficiary, and naming new beneficiaries.
Addendum B.

Appellant Br.,

On February 27, 1993, the day after she signed
11

Grant's accounting, Marjorie died.

R. 7, 17, 282.

At that time,

Lynda was appointed Marge's Personal Representative and Neil was
appointed Successor Personal Representative of Grant's Estate and
continues to function in that capacity.

R. 14, 258.

On or about May 8, 1993, Neil filed a claim against
Marge's Estate for the Checking Account Payments, the Cash
Deficiency and the Personal Injury Settlement, which Lynda
denied, August 18, 1993.

R. 17, 47, 161.

Neil then filed a

Petition and First Amended Petition for Allowance of a Claim in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, and moved for summary judgment.

R. 50, 207, 345.

Lynda

also moved for summary judgment, admitting liability for the Cash
Deficiency of $48,100.00, but denying that Grant's Estate had
been damaged by Marge's withdrawals for medical and living
expenses and claiming that Marge had the right to the Personal
Injury Settlement.

R. 380-404.

The trial court granted and denied both motions in part.
R. 510-15, 520-22.

As to the Checking Account Payments, the

court concluded that Marge did not form the Trust.

R. 511.

But,

the court noted, because she would have been entitled to these
funds had the Trust been formed, and because she used the funds
in accordance with the terms of the Trust, there was no damage to
Grant's Estate under U.C.A. § 75-3-711, and that the breach was
not actionable.

R. 511-12.

As to the Cash Deficiency, the trial court found that the
12

amount of $48,100.00 was undisputed by Lynda and awarded Neil
that amount plus 10% interest, but made no finding on Neil's
refusal to accept Lynda's prior offers.

R. 511-12.

The court

did not award Neil the $2875.40 income or the $1900.00 Personal
Representative fees, noting the amount was "outlined in the
Memoranda filed by [Respondent's counsel] . . . and [had] not
been challenged as being inappropriate by the petitioner".

R.

511.
The trial court granted Neil's claim on the Settlement of
the Personal Injury Claim.

R. 512-513. The court explained that

Marge's acceptance of the settlement was an illegal conversion,
though the statute provides that heirs are entitled to the
settlement of a personal injury claim when the claimant has died
of causes unrelated to the personal injury.

R. 512-513.

Neil has appealed from the Trial Court's determination as
to the Checking Account Payments and the Cash Deficiency
Remainder and the related parts of the Order.

R. 510, 523-524.

Lynda cross-appeals from the Trial Court's determination
on the matter of the Settlement of the Personal Injury Claim and
the related parts of the Order.

R. 510, 531-532.

13

IX.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

For the following reasons, the Trial Court was correct in
denying part of Neil's Motion for Summary Judgment on the matters
of the Checking Account payments and the Cash Deficiency
Remainder and incorrect on the matter of the Settlement of the
Personal Injury Claim:
1.

The language of Grant's Will shows that Grant

intended Marge to have full and unconditional use of his estate
income and use of his estate principal for her health, support
and maintenance without ever suggesting that Marge deplete her
own funds before she was entitled to support.
2.

Though the Trust was not formed, it was

uncontested in the affidavits filed in the Motion for Summary
Judgment and counter affidavits that Marge's withdrawals for
medical and living expenses were reasonable and necessary as the
Will and the Trust required, so that no actual damages resulted
to Grant's Estate.
3.

Grant used a generation skipping trust to help

reduce their estate tax burden, not to preserve his estate for
the residuary remaindermen at Marge's expense.
4.

The phrase "as is necessary", as used in Grant's

Will, did not limit Marge's access to the principal of Grant's
Trust by requiring that she first deplete all her own resources;
rather, the language of Grant's Will gave Marge access to the
principal for all necessary medical and living expenses.
14

5.

Marjorie would also have been entitled to the

funds in Grant's Estate as his sole intestate heir under the Utah
Devolution statute.
6.

Neil and the other beneficiaries are not entitled

to part of the funds which Marge received from estate income and
personal representative fees which were uncontroverted at the
motions for summary judgment.
7.

Marge was entitled to the settlement of her late

husband's personal injury settlement as his wife and sole
surviving intestate heir under U.C.A. § 78-11-12.
8.

As to the $48,100.00 which Marjorie received from

Grant's Estate, the trial court erred in awarding interest
thereon because immediately after Marjorie's death, Linda offered
to return said amount.

15

X.

ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S APPEAL

A. MARJORIE IS NOT LIABLE TO GRANT'S ESTATE FOR BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE MATTER OF THE CHECKING ACCOUNT PAYMENTS AS
HER REASONABLE MEDICAL AND LIVING EXPENSES DID NO DAMAGE TO
GRANT'S ESTATE
Even though Marge did not fund the Trust as Grant's Will
instructed, she disbursed $96,642.55 in Checking Account Payments
from his Estate to pay for her reasonable and necessary living
and medical expenses exactly as Grant intended.

Grant commanded

the Trustees to disburse to Marge the Trust income
condition"
support

and principal "as is necessary
and maintenance".

"C") (emphasis added).

for

"without

[Marge's]

health,

(See Grant's Will Art. V, at Addendum
Since Marge used the principal as

necessary for her health, support and maintenance, exactly as
Grant's Will required, she did not damage Grant's Estate of the
residuary beneficiaries of the trust.

Under U.C.A. § 75-3-711,

the statute upon which Neil relied below (R. 261, Mem. of P. & A.
in Supp. of Pet'rs Mot. for Summ. J.) f a personal representative
can only be held liable for a breach of fiduciary duty for
"damage or loss resulting from the breach of his fiduciary duty."
(emphasis added).

Thus, the legislature of this state has

answered Neil's policy argument.

Marge's Estate should not be

liable for the Checking Account Payments so long as they did not
damage the estate or the residuary beneficiaries, and the trial
court's ruling on this matter should be affirmed.
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1. MARJORIES DISBURSEMENT OF THE CHECKING ACCOUNT
PAYMENTS FROM GRANT'S ESTATE WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
GRANT'S INTENT AS EXPRESSED IN THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
LANGUAGE IN HIS WILL
The plain language of Grant's Will shows that, above all
else, Grant intended to provide for Marge's health, support and
maintenance and to preserve the same high standard of living as
they had enjoyed while he was alive.

There is no language in the

Will indicating that Grant only wanted his estate to benefit
Marge after she depleted all her own resources or that Grant's
Estate was to be preserved for the benefit of any residuary
legatees at Marge's expenses.

Further, Grant's Will plainly

demonstrates his intent to provide for Marge while keeping estate
taxes to a minimum.

Accordingly, Marge's disbursements of funds

from Grant's Estate for her living and medical expenses were in
strict keeping with Grant's instructions and his intent.
It is a well established rule of law that the clear and
unambiguous language of the will as read in its entirety is the
starting point of a will's interpretation.
842 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1992).

Estate of Custick.

This Court has further

established that the purpose for interpreting a will should be to
determine the testator's intent.
1215 (Utah 1980).

Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d

Accordingly, this Court should first look to

the plain language of Grant's Will to determine his intent, and
then examine whether Marge acted in accordance with Grant's
intent.
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a. The Language of Grant's Will Expresses His
Intention To Provide For All Mariorie's Living
and Medical Expenses From His Estate Without
Requiring That She Deplete Her Own Estate
Grant clearly and unambiguously indicated in his Will his
desire to provide for his wife to receive without condition the
income from his estate and the principal for her necessary and
reasonable living and medical expenses.

However, there is no

language in his will to suggest he intended Marge to deplete her
own assets before accessing the principal from the trust.

Such a

restriction runs counter to the plain language of Grant's Will
and to his obvious intentions.
First, Grant's instructions to the Trustees to care for
Marge were mandatory, leaving the Trustees no discretion.
According to Grant's Will, "the Trustees
[Marge] without

any conditions,

all

standard

health,

support

of living

as is necessary

and maintenance

that

she enjoyed

distribute

of the income of

. . . [and] as much of the principal
proper

shall

and to maintain

during

my

to

[the
for

trust]
her

her in

the

lifetime."

(Grant's Will Art. V, at Addendum "C") (emphasis added).

Grant

used the word "shall' 1 to require the Trustees to pay Marge all
his estate income without condition and principal from his Estate
for all her medical and living expenses.
equivalent of a command.

The word "shall" is the

Herr v. Salt Lake County* 525 P.2d 72 8,

729 (Utah 1974)("The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that
of a command."); Webster's Third International Dictionary 2085
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(1981); Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) . Thus the
plain meaning of the language was that the Trustees were
commanded to distribute this money to Marge.

Contrary to Neil's

arguments, under the plain language of the Grant's Will, the
trustees had no discretion in disbursing the principal of Grant's
Estate for Marge's medical and living expenses.
The circumstances in 1991, when Grant and Marge executed
their identical wills, suggested that their medical and living
expenses would be high and could possibly deplete their
individual estates.

Both Grant and Marge were confined to their

beds in their own home requiring the expenditure of substantial
amounts of money for health care.

They both had reason to

believe the other would continue to incur large medical and homecare expenses if one were to die.

However, the language in their

wills shows that they wanted to be cared for in their home as
long as they had the financial means without any regard for
residuary legatees. And if Grant's Will is to be read in its
entirety, the language suggests that no expense was to be spared
in caring for the Marge after his death.
Furthermore, Grant and Marge were used to a high standard
of living while they were healthy which continued when they were
confined to their home, and which Grant wished Marge to maintain
after his death.

When they were healthy, they attended Utah Jazz

basketball games regularly, traveled extensively and made large
donations to civic organizations.
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When they were no longer able

to cook for themselves, they would order expensive meals
delivered by the New Yorker and the Oyster Bar.
meager lifestyle.

Theirs was not a

(R. 406-408, Wood Aff.).

Though the plain language of Grant's Will commanded the
Trustees to maintain Marge in the same high standard of living,
her failing health made that difficult.

Most of Marge's expenses

after Grant's death were related to her medical care.

In fact,

of the $96,642.55 disbursed in Checking Account Payments,
$75,439.15 were connected to Marge's medical and home nursing
care.

Lynda Wood stated in sworn affidavit that Marge sought the

least expensive medical and home care that she could obtain.1
She did not continue ordering extravagant meals and ceased her
donations to charity.
By the standard Neil suggests, however, this was not
enough.

Instead, Marge should have depleted all her own

resources and exhausted her own estate before turning to the
1

The reasonableness of Marge's expenditures was uncontested
by Neil in his Motion for Summary Judgment and must, therefore, be
upheld by this Court. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
[by affidavit, . . .] an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this

rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered
against
him.
U.R.C.P., Rule 56 (e) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, this Court should also uphold the trial court
as to the fact that Marge's medical and living expenses were
reasonable.
20

principal of Grant's Estate.

Such an extreme standard would have

required Marge to liquidate her half interest equity in their
marital house in which she lived to exhaust her own resources.
In addition, Neil's interpretation would have required the
Trustees to pay Grant's doctors $10,000.00 each, while Marge
exhausted her own resources.

The plain language of Grant's Will

in its plain language shows no such intent.
Second, nothing within the four corners of the will
suggests that Marge was to deplete her own resources before
accessing the principal from the Trust.

Despite the plain

language in the Will, Neil has suggested that Grant's instruction
that the Trustees invade the principal "as is necessary" for
Marge's health care and living expenses be interpreted to give
her access to the principal only after she exhausted all her own
resources.

Neil claims "The fact

that the Will instructed the

co-trustees to provide for Marge's maintenance should
resources
wife's

become depleted,

basic

welfare

her own

indicates Grant's intent to ensure his

during the remainder of her life."

(Appellant's Br. at 27)(emphasis added).

The requirement of the

depletion of Marge's assets is clearly not a "fact".

It is not

supported or even suggested by any language in the Will.
Grant intend to provide for his wife's "basic

welfare".

Nor did
Grant's

language in his Will expressed his clear intent to maintain her
in the manner and style of living to which they had been
accustomed while he was alive. As the evidence indicates, this
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exceeded "basic welfare."

Neil's assessment of this "fact" is

clearly erroneous, and it should not sway the Court's attention
from the clear and unambiguous language of Grant's Will.
As detailed below, the better reasoned case law opposes
such an extrapolation.

For the Trustees or this Court to make

such a determination would be to read beyond the plain language
of Grant's Will and would contravene the Testator's express
intent as shown by the language in the Will.

b. Case Law Supports a Reading Of Grant's Will
to Benefit Mariorie Without Requiring Her To
Deplete Her Own Estate
Case law from several jurisdictions supports a plain
reading of the language in Grant's Will to require the Trustees
to invade the corpus of Grant's Trust for Marge's medical and
living expenses without requiring her to exhaust her own assets.2
The courts of this jurisdiction have not considered this matter

2

Neil has asked the Court to consider several old cases from
Eastern jurisdictions in determining the meaning of the phrase "as
is necessary". The cases, which date between 1889 and 1949, arrive
at the interpretation that the phrase calls for the total depletion
of the beneficiaries own resources before accessing the trust
principal.
Instead, the Court should consider the more recent cases as
discussed in this section and cited below: Taylor v. Hutchinson,
497 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) : Estate of Wells v. Sanford, 663
S.W.2d 174 (Ark. 1984); Hamilton National Bank v. Childers, 211
S.E.2d 723 (Ga. 1975); Neilsen v. Duyveionck, 263 N.E.2d 743 (111.
App. Ct. 1968);
Estate of Dodge v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa
1979); In re Coats Estate, 581 S.W.2d 392, 393-96 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); and see
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 12 8, comment e
(1957).
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previously.

Accordingly, in interpreting the requirement that

the principal of Grant's bypass trust "shall" be invaded for
Marge's necessary medical and living costs, this Court should
consider the specific language and facts in this case and the
persuasive cases cited herein.
The Court should first look to a Wyoming case where a
will with language similar to Grant's was under consideration.
In that case, the testator authorized the invasion of the income
and principal of the trust "as may be necessary for [grantor's
wife's] proper care and support."

First National Bank and Trust

Company of Wyoming v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224, 226 (Wyo. 1966).
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted, "It is also a well recognized
rule that the provisions of a husband's will or of a trust
created by him conferring benefits upon his wife are to be
construed liberally in her behalf."

Id. at 229.

In deciding that there had been no violation of the
remaindermen's rights or breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty,
the Wyoming court considered several matters relevant in our
case.

First, the court pointed to the remaindermen's distant

relation from the grantor.

The court favored, as should this

Court, the care and support of the wife over the enrichment of
the collateral relatives.

Second, the Wyoming court considered

that the wife had been accustomed to a high standard of living
and that the grantor would therefore have intended that his wife
have any amount of money necessary to maintain the same
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lifestyle.

Grant's intent was the same.

The court concluded

that "the primary purpose was to assure that [the grantor's wife]
would be supported in a proper manner without having to rely
soley [sic] upon the income from the trust and the property he
left her."

Id. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, the Court should consider the relevant
holding in the recent Kansas Supreme Court case Godfrey v.
Chandley, 811 P.2d 1248 (Kansas 1991).

In that case, Chandley's

husband died leaving a trust for Chandley's benefit which was to
provide her with principal "as may be necessary for her support,
health and maintenance."

Id. at 1250. Among the factors the

Kansas court considered in interpreting the phrase "as may be
necessary" was that the wife was incompetent and under nursing
care.

That court looked to a long line of cases supporting the

rule that "where a settlor directs the trustee to pay the
beneficiary so much as is necessary for support and maintenance,
an inference arises that the settlor intended the beneficiary to
receive support from the trust estate, regardless of other
income."

Id. at 1251.

The obvious reason for the Kansas court's

definition is that the use of the phrase "as is necessary" by the
testator was not connected to the beneficiary's assets or ability
to pay, but was only included to establish the amount of her
reasonable medical and living expenses.
The Kansas court held on this matter, "The testator
obviously intended to provide maintenance for his wife for her
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life.

His provision is limited only by what is necessary.

In

other words, it cannot be used to provide non-essential items."
Id. at 1253.
Finally, this Court should consider a most recent case
from Montana, Estate of Lindaren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994).
The conservator of a testamentary trust beneficiary petitioned
for an order requiring the trustee to pay the beneficiary's
nursing home expenses and burial and funeral costs. The trustee
pointed to the language of the trust limiting disbursement of
principal as "necessary for her support, care and health during
her lifetime," and argued this language required the beneficiary
to show financial need.

The Montana Supreme Court disagreed,

stating
We will not interpret the liberal Trust language by
way of a limited reading of the word 'necessary',
referred to by the [trial] court as 'need'. The
Trust does not itself contain any limiting language.
. . . The Trust does not provide for the
expenditure of Beneficiary's estate before any
payments are to be made from the Trust. We will not
read into the Trust this limitation.
Id. at 1282-83.
This Court should follow these well reasoned cases and be
equally restrained by the language of the Will and the Grantor's
intent and should not extrapolate other meanings of the phrase
"as is necessary".
However, Neil would have the Court rely on one much older
and distinguishable Colorado case, Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d
853 (Colo. 1950), to suggest Grant's will should be read to
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benefit Marjorie only after her own estate had been completely
exhausted.

But, the facts of that case are so different that

Dunklee should not be applied as persuasive in the present case.
In Dunklee, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted a will
in which "[i]nstead of directing the Trustee to pay the
beneficiary a sum to cover such necessities, she merely
'authorized7 him to provide him with the necessities of life 'as
may be necessary7".

Id. at 854. The Colorado court considered

that the beneficiary had since remarried, was profiting over
$7,000.00 per month from a thriving medical practice and was
receiving income from property which he owned.

Further, that

court construed the word "authorized" used in the conveyance as
being permissive only. Id.

Thus, the court ruled that the

trustee could withhold the trust principal.

Clearly, the

language of that will made the beneficiary's support merely
permissible, not mandatory, and, since the beneficiary was well
cared for beyond the basic necessities of life, the court
concluded he did not need the estate's support.
These are not the facts of our case.

First, the language

of Grant's will does not merely authorize the use of such funds,
it makes the Trustees duty to support Marge mandatory.

As

discussed above, Grant gave the Trustees no discretion in
providing Marge with the income and "as much of the principal as
is necessary" for Marge to be as comfortable as she had been
while Grant was alive.
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Second, Marjorie was not working and earning income,
profiting from real estate or relying on the income of a new
spouse, nor did she have such future prospects.

She was in fact

over eighty years old, confined to her bed and in need of
constant medical care due to her poor health.

She used the money

Grant bequeathed her for the very purpose he intended: to pay for
her medical care and attempt to live the lifestyle to which she
had been accustomed during Grant's life.
Because of these significant differences between Dunklee
and the case at hand, this Court should reject the Dunklee test.
The Kansas court in Godfrey dismissed Dunklee on the language and
circumstances "where the settlor manifests an intention that the
trust property be applied to the beneficiary's support only if
and to the extent the beneficiary is in actual need."
1251.

Godfrey at

Clearly this is not our case.
This reasoning in Finkbiner and Godfrey, in addition to

the other modern cases cited above, support the conclusion that,
reading Grant's Will as a whole, Marjorie's other resources were
unrelated to her right to the trust principal.

Accordingly, the

Court should conclude that the plain meaning of "shall" in
Grant's Will is a command to the Trustees to support Marjorie,
and that the phrase "as is necessary" was used for an objective
standard, or to show how much to pay her, rather than requiring
Marge to deplete all her own resources before benefitting from
the principal of Grant's Trust.

The Court should look to the
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plain language of Grant's Will which provided for all of Marge's
expenses necessary for her health, support and maintenance in the
standard of living to which she had been accustomed,

c. The Language of Grant's Will Demonstrates
That He Also Intended to Minimize Estate Taxes,
But Not to Preserve the Estate For Residual
Beneficiaries at Marjorie's Expense
Grant's Will clearly and unambiguously shows that Grant
commanded the trustees to provide for all his wife's living and
medical expenses, allowing her to maintain the same standard of
living they shared during Grant's lifetime.

Such language

expresses Grant's unmistakable intention in establishing the
bypass trust to provide liberally for all his wife's needs. His
Will also suggests that Grant intended to avoid, as much as
legally possible, excessive taxation of either his or his wife's
estate.

However, Grant's Will makes perfectly clear that these

intentions superseded any desire to preserve his Estate for
residuary beneficiaries.

Under these circumstances, the Court

"should recognize the natural inclination and purpose of the
testator to favor his wife over remote heirs who are not his
lineal descendants."

Purdue v. Roberts, 314 So. 2d 280, 283

(Ala. 1975).
First, after providing for Marge's medical and living
expenses, Grant called for the bypass trust to minimize his and
Marge's estate taxes. Much of his Will is dedicated to
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consideration of tax consequences.

For example, in Article VIII

of his Will, Grant leaves instructions for funding the Trust and
other financial plans with several references to Federal Estate
Tax law, which shows that Grant was well aware of tax
consequences and constructed his Will to avoid estate taxes for
both him and his wife as much as possible.

In addition, he hired

an estate tax specialist, Brett Paulsen, Esq., to review the will
and to confirm that the trust provisions would reduce their tax
burden while maximizing Marge's access to Grant's funds.
In fact, the consideration of estate tax reduction is a
common reasoning behind generation skipping trusts.

Thus, common

reasoning and the language and intent behind Grant's Will show
that his purpose behind the bypass trust was to avoid reduce
taxes, not to limit Marge's access to his estate.
Second, there is no language in Grant's Will to support
the notion that Grant wanted to preserve his estate for the
residuary beneficiaries at his wife's expense.

On the contrary,

paragraph three of Article VII of Grant's Will indicates the
extent Grant intended to provide for the remaindermen.

Grant

directed that, if he became incompetent or otherwise incapable of
caring for himself, Marjorie was to act as conservator of his
estate and care for Grant at his home in which Marge had a half
interest as long as "there are funds available" and "that
whatever funds are necessary be spent for my support, care and
maintenance without

regard

for

conserving
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any portion

of my

estate for

subsequent

thereof.11

beneficiaries

Art. 7)(emphasis added).

(Grant's Will,

Marjorie's earlier will, executed

simultaneously with Grant's, had the same clause, showing that
both Grant and Marge intended above all else, to care for each
other and to spare no expense in providing for the other in the
manner to which they had been accustomed during their married
life, regardless of whether that expenditure depleted the
potential interest of the residuary.
In fact, before the residuary beneficiaries, Grant
desired his doctors to share in the estate and he made this point
clear in his Will.

Grant commanded that his two doctors were

each to receive $10,000.00 from the Trust before the subsequent
beneficiaries received any money; the remaindermen only had a
possible interest in the amount that was left after Marjorie, his
widow, met her own living and medical expenses and after both his
doctors received their $10,000.00 gifts.

Had Grant been so

concerned about his wife's relatives benefitting from his estate,
he would have made such specific gifts to Neil and his family.
Instead, Grant's Will simply shows that he intended to
benefit the residual legatees only the amount left in his Estate
after the Trustee's provided for Marge's medical and living
expenses and made the gifts to Grant's doctors.
Grant's primary intent in forming the bypass trust was to
avoid taxes on the second generation distribution of his estate,
which may have reduced substantially the amount received by the
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remaindermen in addition to Marge's living expenses.

The total

amount received by Neil and the other remaindermen was dependant
on how long Marjorie lived and the costs of her medical and
living expenses.

Had Marjorie outlived the assets in the trust,

the remaindermen would have received nothing.

As long as the

residual left from these expenditures goes to the remainder
legatees, they have no loss or damage.

See Matter of Winston,

425 N.E.2d 973 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
If Marge had funded the Trust as set forth in Grant's
Will, Neil would have been her co-trustee and, by his own
statements and positions in this case, Marge, an 80 year-old
bedridden person, would have had to fight him for every dime she
withdrew for her living and medical expenses, benefitting Neil
and the other residuary.

(See Appellant Br. at 17-18).

This

clearly would have been contrary to Grant's intent in providing
for his 80 year old wife.

His desire to care for his wife and

reduce estate taxes should not be ignored; they were the main
purposes of the Trust.
Reading Grant's Will as a whole, Neil has no basis for
claiming that Grant wished to preserve his Estate for his
unrelated residual legatees at his wife's expense.

Instead, as

the plain language of his Will shows, Grant's main intention in
calling for a bypass trust was to benefit his wife as much as
possible while minimizing their estate taxes.
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d. Petitioner's Claim That He, As Co-Trustee to
Grant's Estate Would Have Denied Marjorie's
Claims For Living and Medical Expenses Is
Speculative and Irrelevant to This Case
Neil claims the trial court's conclusion that Marge was
entitled to the support of Grant's Estate was speculative, that
he "has taken exception to each of Marge's expenditures from the
Estate", and that he would probably have withheld the funds from
Marge.

(Appellant Br. at 17-19).

these claims.

Neil has no basis for making

He offers no citation to the record to support his

statement as required by Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Nor does he address Lynda's affidavit supporting her

Motion for Summary Judgment wherein she states the necessity and
reasonableness of Marge's medical and living expenses.

Neither

does he cite any counter affidavit filed by him or any other
person to dispute Lynda's affidavit.

He also ignores the

mandatory nature of Grant's devise, failing to address the
meaning of the term "shall" and comparing this case to others
which allowed the trustees to rely on their own discretion.
Instead, Neil speculates what he might have done as Co-Trustee of
Grant's Estate, evidence of which was not before the trial court
and thus cannot be considered here.
The trial court's ruling on the motions for summary
judgment required no speculation.

Instead, the court arrived at

its conclusion by looking at the clear and unambiguous language
of the will and the uncontested affidavits.
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The trial court

found the funds Marge took from Grant's Estate were funds "that
she would have been entitled to receive had she funded the
trust,"

(R. 511

Mem. Decision at 2).

The court based this

finding upon the fact that Neil had not filed an affidavit
opposing Lynda's affidavit attesting to the reasonableness of
Marge's expenditures.3
The trial court did not find that Neil would have
cooperated in allocating those funds.

But, the question was not

whether Neil would have honored his role as Trustee by disbursing
the income and principal from the Trust for Marge's living and
medical expenses.
the disbursements.

The question was whether Marge was entitled to
Clearly, if the Trust had been funded she

would have been so entitled.

If Neil had denied Marge's claims,

his actions would have prompted another suit for breach of
fiduciary duty.

As it is, the court engaged in no improper

speculation in arriving at a decision found in the plain language
of Grant's Will and supported by unopposed affidavit.

But any

claim by Neil as to how he would hypothetically have acted as CoTrustee is improper speculation beyond the scope of this
proceeding and should not be considered by this Court.

Again, pursuant to Rule 56(e) , it is not enough for Neil to
address this matter in a pleading or affidavit. Since he has not
filed any affidavits opposing Lynda's affidavit, her statements as
to the reasonableness of Marge's expenses therein must be admitted.
33

2. MARGE WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED AS GRANT'S LEGAL SPOUSE TO THE
ASSETS OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE UNDER THE UTAH DEVOLUTION STATUTE
While the trial court never reached the issue, another
reason to uphold the decision below is that Utah statutory law
entitles Marge to the money from Grant's Estate through
devolution, as she was the sole beneficiary and thus entitled to
the assets from the trust created by Grant's Will.

Under the

terms of U.C.A. § 75-3-101, which provides in part, "Upon the
death of a person his real and personal property devolves to
persons to whom it is devised by his last will . . . .", title to
the money required for her living expenses devolved to Marjorie
upon Grant's death. See People v. McCormick. 784 P.2d 808 (Colo.
App. 19 89).

Under the language of the Will, Marjorie was the

person ultimately entitled to the income from the estate and in
addition to so much of the principal for her living and medical
expenses under U.C.A. § 75-3-101.
Marge's use of the money for the purposes expressed in
Grant's Will would have been in accordance with the statute.
While the trial court did not address the issue, it was raised in
the court below and is an additional reason why the residuary
beneficiaries have not been damaged by Marge's withdrawals from
Grant's Estate.
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3, BECAUSE MARJORIE USED THE CHECKING ACCOUNT PAYMENTS
FROM GRANT'S ESTATE FOR THE PURPOSES INDICATED IN GRANT'S
WILL, SHE CAUSED NO ACTUAL DAMAGE TO GRANT'S ESTATE SO
THAT NEIL'S CLAIM AS TO THAT AMOUNT IS NOT ACTIONABLE
There was no actual damage to Grant's Estate since Marge
used the funds according to the express intent of Grant's Will.
Neil's claim was based on U.C.A. § 75-3-711 which holds a
personal representative liable for "damage or loss resulting from
the breach of fiduciary duty."

Since there was no actual damage

to the residual beneficiaries as provided in the motions, the
trial court correctly found that Neil's claim for the Checking
Account Payments was not actionable.
Further, Marjorie's Estate would have the right to an
offset for these amounts.

Linda claimed below that if the trial

court ruled that the money had to be paid back to Grant's Estate,
such an order may have spawned further needless litigation
between Marjorie's and Grant's Estates over the issues raised in
this case: that is, whether or not the Trustees' duty to provide
for Marge's medical and living expenses was mandatory or
discretionary, whether her expenses were reasonable, and whether
they were necessary.

(R. 402, Mem. in Resp. to Pet'rs Mot. for

Summ. J. at 21)
If this Court were to adjudicate that Marjorie's Estate
is liable to Grant's Estate for her living and medical expenses,
income of Grant's Estate, or any other monies, such a judgment
would give rise to a claim by Marjorie's estate for the return of
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the same monies, i.e. the income from Grant's Estate and the sum
of $96,642.55, as living and medical expenses to which she was
clearly entitled under the terms of Grant's Will.
As the trial court correctly found, there was no ultimate
damage to Grant's Estate or to his residuary legatees, and there
can be no liability found in Marge or her Estate for the Checking
Account Payments related to her reasonable and necessary medical
and living expenses.

(R. 511-512).

B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO AN ESTATE CASH DEFICIENCY IN THE AMOUNT OF
352,875.40, BUT ONLY IN THE AMOUNT OF $48,100.00

The trial court was correct to conclude that Neil was not
entitled to the difference between $52,875.40 which Marge took
from Grant's Estate and $48,100,00 which the court deemed a
conversion and ordered repaid to Grant's Estate ("Cash Deficiency
Remainder") (R. 510-511).

The trial court was justified in its

decision for two reasons: the Cash Deficiency Remainder legally
belonged to Marge and Neil did not dispute the accounting.
First, the Cash Deficiency Remainder rightfully belonged
to Marge.

Marge deposited into her own account a Certificate of

Deposit in Grant's name, valued at $50,000.00 plus interest in
the amount of $2 875.40, as a claim in Grant's Estate.

Lynda

acknowledged after Marge's death that the deposit was in error
and has offered to repay that amount to Grant's Estate.
Resp'ts Mot. for Summ. J. at 3).
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(R. 3 84,

However, Neil, as Successor

Personal Representative, and his counsel, have repeatedly refused
this offer.

(R. 411, McCoy Aff. para 9).

Grant Thornton, who made the accounting of Grant and
Marge's estates found a shortage of interest income from Grant's
Estate of $2,875.40.

(R. 340, 352, Livingston Aff. at 3).

This

interest from the CD, had it been deposited in Grant's account,
would have belonged to Marge by the terms of Grant's Will.
Accordingly, Marge was entitled to the $2,875.40 in interest.
Additionally, Marge, in her accounting, made a claim for
$1913.05 as a personal representative's fee against Grant's
Estate.

Neil never contested the claim, so the court was correct

to accept it as a reasonable personal representative fee and not
award this amount to Neil.

(R. 511-512).

Second, the trial court was correct to not award the Cash
Deficiency Remainder to Neil because the amount had been
accounted for in affidavits attached to Lynda's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the proceedings below.

Neil failed to

contest the accounting, offering no affidavits, depositions or
evidence of any kind contradicting the accounting, so pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), the matter was properly
decided in Respondent's favor.

(Supra at 22, fn.l).

As Neil failed to submit any affidavit contesting the
Cash Deficiency Remainder, the trial court correctly entered the
finding against him.

Thus, for these two reasons, Neil has no

valid claim to the Cash Deficiency Remainder.
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C. NEIL HAS RAISED A CLAIM OF ESTOPPEL FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL WHICH THE COURT MUST REJECT AS IT IS RAISED IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. IT IS BASELESS AND IT IS UNSUPPORTED
Neil has raised a claim of estoppel on appeal which he
did not raise in the proceedings below.

He has asserted that

"Marge did not do equity in this case . . . [so] Ms. Wood should
accordingly be estopped from claiming Marge's estate has no
liability to Grant's estate."

(Appellant's Br. at 39). This

Court has cited the well established principal that legal issues
not presented to the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.
Corp.,

Ong International Inc. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Avenue

850 P.2d 447, 455 n. 31 (Utah 1993) ("Failure to raise

the point [below] precludes its consideration here.").

Neil has

not offered any explanation as to why he did not raise this
argument below.

Accordingly, this matter of estoppel which Neil

raises here for the first time cannot be considered by the Court.
In addition, the Court should reject Neil's claim of
estoppel because it runs contrary to the equitable notion that a
party may raise defenses to a claim brought against it.

For Neil

to assert that Marge's Estate can in no way defend the charges
against it is unfounded.
charge.

Neil cites no cases supporting his

The one case he does cite, Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah

Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990), is not
a probate case and is in no way relevant to the case at hand.
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Nor does Neil try to address the distinction which the
court below made between Marge's breach of fiduciary duty and the
lack of liability due to an absence of damages.

The fact is,

though the trial court found that Marge had breached her
fiduciary duty, it also found that the claim was not actionable
because no damage was proven.

The two matters are distinct.

Inasmuch as Neil has not addressed this distinction, nor offered
any evidence or case law supporting his claim, and inasmuch as he
has raised this matter for the first time on appeal, the Court
should reject Neil's claim that Lynda be estopped from defending
against liability.
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XI,

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS CROSS-APPEAL

A. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, MARGE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROCEEDS OF HER LATE HUSBAND'S
PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT
The trial court erred in ruling that Marge was not
entitled by statutory law to the settlement of Grant's personal
injury suit.

As Grant's only surviving intestate heir, Marjorie

was entitled to the $12,445.86 settlement of a personal injury
case on Grant's behalf, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-11-12 subsection
(b).

This statute provides that if a person having a personal

injury claim dies of causes unrelated to the personal injury, the
heirs would collect all "out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on
behalf of that injured person as a result of his injury."

U.C.A.

§ 75-1-201 defines "heirs", as used in U.C.A. 78-11-12, as "those
persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under
the statute of intestate succession to the property of a
decedent."

Since Marge had paid for most of Grant's medical

expenses incurred through his personal injury, she was entitled
to a reimbursement of that sum by Grant's Estate.
Grant had incurred large medical expenses as a result of
his personal injury.

However, the final accounting of Grant's

Estate showed that he only paid $112.30 in medical bills, making
it apparent that his estate never bore the expenses.

Marge's

Estate, on the other hand, expended $18,943.30 from 1990 - 1991
on medical bills, designated by the accounting as incurred by
either Grant or "Both", that is, between Marge and Grant.
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Marge's Estate clearly bore the greater loss from the medical
expenses incurred as a result of Grant's personal injury.
Marjorie was legally the surviving spouse of Grant and
his only surviving intestate heir and as such was entitled to the
amount incurred by Grant as a result of the personal injury.

The

remaindermen, whom Petitioner represents, a sister, nephew and
niece of Marjorie only, with no blood relationship to Grant, did
not have standing as intestate heirs to claim any of this
settlement.

See Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980);

and In re Behm's Estate, 213 P.2d 657 (Utah 1950); and Parmley v.
Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557 (Utah 1924).

In Behm's

Estate, this Court held that proceeds collected on behalf of the
decedent from the wrong-doer in a tort action should not be
intermingled with other assets of the decedent's estate so as to
subject the claim to the costs and expenses of estate
administration, but should be distributed directly to the
intestate heirs.

This Court stated

Generally speaking, there are two methods used by
courts when involving such a distribution. The
first is in accordance with the particular statute
on descent and distribution for probate proceedings.
The second is by proportional method, the probate
being determined by the loss of each heir. We adopt
the later method. . . . For many years, this court
has confirmed the principal that the statutory
beneficiaries take separate and apart from the
estate. The funds may pass through the hands of the
personal representative but the cause of action is a
new cause which runs directly through the heirs.
Id. at 660.
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In this case, it was Marjorie who suffered through the
problems which the injuries inflicted on her husband, and, upon
Grant's death, suffered the immediate loss of her husband and
companion, not the remaindermen who were not even Grant's blood
relatives.

The statute is phrased in the disjunctive that the

money be disbursed to the decedent's heirs or his personal
representative.

The statute does not require that the money be

paid to Grant's personal representative.

The only case law in

Utah on the subject, Behm's Estate, interpreting this type of
statute, held that the heirs who suffered the loss receive their
recovery in proportion to their loss without the funds being
intermingled with the rest of the estate.
Accordingly, the trial court's decision that Marjorie
should have deposited the check for $12,445.86 into Grant's
Estate for distribution to persons other than herself as
surviving spouse is incorrect.

This Court should adhere to its

decision in Behm's Estate and reverse the trial court, and should
not award Neil any portion of the $12,445.86.

B. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTEREST ON THE CASH DEFICIENCY
OF 348,100.00 AS THAT AMOUNT HAD BEEN OFFERED TO NEIL AND HIS
ATTORNEYS AND REFUSED
Cross-appellant, Lynda Wood, offered to Neil the sum of
$48,100.00 shortly after Marjorie7s death and also offered the
same amount to Neil's attorneys subsequently throughout.
offer has never been accepted by Neil.
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Lynda's

(R. 411, McCoy Aff. at

2).

According to this Court's principal that rules regarding

damages on conversion "can be modified in the interest of
fairness," Winters v. Charles Anthony Jewelers, 586 P.2d 453, 454
(Utah 1978), this Court should eliminate the award of interest on
this amount.
Further a tender of the converted property prior to the
commencement of the action will reduce the damages of a claimant.
Colby v. Reed, 99 U.S. 560, 25 L.Ed. 484 (1879).
were argued to the trial court in final argument.

These matters
(R. 5 63).

Nevertheless, the trial court awarded interest at 10% per anum on
said amount.

The Cross-appellant takes the position that the

imposition of interest on that money was error where the crossappellant offered to return it prior to the claim being made.
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XII.

CONCLUSION 8c RELIEF REQUESTED

Lynda Wood respectfully requests that this Court find in
her favor and affirm the Trial Court's Order as to the Checking
Account Payments and the Cash Deficiency Remainder and reverse
the Trial Court's Order as to the Personal Injury Settlement by
granting Lynda judgment as a matter of law on the amount of
$12,445*86 with interest per the Order and to delete the interest
on the Cash Deficiency.

DATED this

day of November/7 1995

Tohn L. McCoy
Attorney for Appellee,
Lynda Wood
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Last Will and Testament of G. Grant Sims
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision
Trial Court's Order of Motions for Summary
Judgment
Determinative Case Law
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

fault judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.

Rule 56

Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does nvi. so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered agams: him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
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and substituted "the value" for "a ratio of bond
dollars to letter of credit dollars" in the second
sentence; in present Subdivision (5), substituted "current assets" for "real assets" in two
places; and rewrote present Subdivision (6) to
delete a table setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstanding to net worth value.
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer-

Rule 4-501

ciaT for "qualifications of in the rule heading,
inserted "re-qualification and disqualification"
and "commercial" in the Intent section, and
substantially rewrote the rule.
The 1993 amendment in Subdivision (6)
added the designation (A), deleted "the lesser
of $500,000 or" after "exceed" in Subdivision
(A), and added Subdivision (B).

Rule 4*408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy;
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this
rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)

ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages

(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either partv may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. TI^ implication shaxi be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
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Rule 4-502

of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of the proposed order" following "supporting documentation" in

Subdivision (l)(b) and made related stylistic
changes and inserted "principal" in Subdivision (3)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALTSIS

When rule applies.
Cited.
When rule applies.
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff
should have been given ten days to respond, as
prescribed by Subdivision (l)(b) of this rule.
Gillmor v. Curr.mingB, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Even though the trial court had considered
both parties' motions and memoranda for and

against the award of attorney fees, it erred in
entering its decision before the time allowed
under this rule to file a reply memorandum
had expired and in not reconsidering its decision by reviewing plaintiffs' reply memorandum and revised affidavits. American Vending
Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 242 Utah Adv. Rep. 29
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531
Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 .Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380
Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery documents.
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 days of trial.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1; Parties conducting discovery ur.der Rules 33. 34 and 36 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discovery requests with the clerk of the
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
discovery requests have been served on the other parties and the date of
service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the clerk of
the court.
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the original with a
copy of the proof of service afiixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery
request and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party
responding to the discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the
proof of service afiixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses and the proof of
service upon the opposing party or counsel. The discovery requests and re-
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(a) to inspect and monitor property held by the fiduciary, including interests in sole proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations and any assets owned by any such
business enterprise, for the purpose of determining compliance with environmental law affecting the property
and to respond to any actual or threatened violation of
any environmental law affecting the property held by the
fiduciary;
(b) to take, on behalf of the estate or trust, any action
necessary to prevent, abate, or otherwise remedy any
actual or threatened violation of any environmental law
affecting property held by the fiduciary, either before or
after the initiation of an enforcement action by any
governmental body;
(c) to refuse to accept property if the fiduciary determines that any property to be donated to the trust or
estate either is contaminated by any hazardous substance
or is being used or has been used for any activity directly
or indirectly involving hazardous substance which could
result in liability to the trust or estate or otherwise impair
the value of the assets held in the trust or estate;
(d) to settle or compromise at any time any and all
claims against the trust or estate which may be asserted
by any governmental body or private party involving the
alleged violation of any environmental law affecting property held in trust or in an estate;
(e) to disclaim any'power granted by any document,
statute, or rule of law which, in the sole discretion of the
fiduciary, may cause the fiduciary to incur personal liability under any environmental law; or
(f) to decline to serve as a fiduciary if the fiduciary
reasonably believes that there is or may be a conflict of
interest between it in its fiduciary capacity and in its
individual capacity because of potential claims or liabilities which may be asserted against it on behalf of the
trust or estate because of the type or condition of assets
held in the trust or estate.
(2) For purposes of this section "environmental law" means
iny federal, state, or local law, rule, regulation or ordinance
•elating to protection of the environment or human health.
?or purposes of this section, "hazardous substances" means
my substance defined as hazardous or toxic or which is
otherwise regulated by any environmental law.
(3) The fiduciary is entitled to charge the cost of any
inspection, review, abatement, response, cleanup, or remedial
action authorized in this section against the income or principal of the trust or estate. A fiduciary shall not be personally
liable to any beneficiary or other party for any decrease in
value of assets in trust or in an estate by reason of the
fiduciary's compliance with any environmental law, specifically including any reporting requirement under the law.
Neither the acceptance by the fiduciary of property or a failure
by the fiduciary to inspect property shall be considered to
create any inference as to whether or not there is or may be
any liability under any environmental law with respect to the
property.
(4) This section applies to all estates and trusts in existence
upon and created after July 1, 1991.
(5) No exercise by a fiduciary of any of the powers granted
in this section shall constitute a transaction which is affected
by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary.
1991

PART 2
DEFINITIONS
75-1-201. General definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters which are applicable to specific chapters or
parts, as used in this code:

75-1-201

(1) "Application" means a written request to the registrar for an order of informal probate or appointment
under Chapter 3, Part 3.
(2) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries,
includes a person who has any present or future interest,
vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of an
interest by assignment or other transfer and as it relates
to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to
enforce the trust.
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a
child under this code by intestate succession from the
parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any
person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild,
or any more remote descendant.
(4) "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and
protected persons, includes liabilities of the decedent or
protected person whether arising in contract, in tort, or
otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or
after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of
a conservator, including funeral expenses. The term does
not include estate or inheritance taxes, Utah income
taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific assets alleged to be
included in the estate.
(5) "Court" means any of the district courts of the state
of Utah.
(6) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by
a court to manage the estate of a protected person.
(7) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property and when
used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal
property by will.
(8) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to
receive a devise. In the case of a devise to an existing trust
or trustee, or to a trustee or trust described by will, the
trust or trustee is the devisee, and the beneficiaries are
not devisees.
(9) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as
described by Section 75-5-401.
(10) "Distributee" means any person who has received
property of a decedent from his personal representative
other than as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary
trustee is a distributee only to the extent of distributed
assets or increment thereto remaining in the trustee's
hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the
trustee has distributed property received from a personal
representative is a distributee of the personal representative. For purposes of this subsection, testamentary
trustee includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred
by will to the extent of the devised assets.
(11) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent,
trust, or other person whose affairs are subject to this
code as originally constituted and as it exists from time to
time during administration.
(12) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate which is described in Section 75-2-402.
(13) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative,
guardian, conservator, and trustee.
(14) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of another jurisdiction.
(15) "Formal proceedings" means those conducted before a judge with notice to interested persons.
(16) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a
guardian of a minor or incapacitated person pursuant to
testamentary or court appointment but excludes one who
is merely a guardian ad litem.
(17) "Heirs" means those persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a decedent.

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
ion
-808.
-809.
-810.
-811.
-812.
-813.
-814.
-815.
-816.

Part 12
Individual liability of personal representative.
Secured claims.
Claims not due and contingent or unliquidated
claims.
Counterclaims.
Execution and levies prohibited.
Compromise of claims.
Encumbered assets.
Administration in more than one state — Duty
of personal representative.
Final distribution to domiciliary representative.
Part 9
Special Provisions Relating to
Distribution

•901.
•902.
•903.
•904.
•905.
•906.
•907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
912.
913.
914.
915.
916.

Successors' rights if no administration.
Distribution — Order in which assets appropriated — Abatement.
Right of retainer.
Interest on general pecuniary devise.
Penalty clause for contest.
Distribution in kind — Valuation — Method.
Distribution in kind — Evidence.
Distribution — Right or title of distributee.
Improper distribution — Liability of distributee.
Purchasers from distributees protected.
Partition for purpose of distribution.
Private agreements among successors to decedent binding on personal representative.
Distributions to trustee.
Disposition of unclaimed assets.
Distribution to person under disability.
Apportionment of estate taxes.
Part 10
Closing Estates

1001.
1002.
L003.
L004.
L005.
L006.
L007.
.008.

Formal proceedings terminating administration — Testate or intestate — Order of general protection.
Formal proceedings terminating testate administration — Order construing will without adjudicating testacy.
Closing estates — By sworn statement of personal representative — Waiver of accountings.
Liability of distributees to claimants.
Limitations on proceedings against personal
representative.
Limitations on actions and proceedings
against distributees.
Certificate discharging liens securing fiduciary
performance.
Subsequent administration.
Part 11
Compromise of Controversies

101.
102.

75-3-104

Effect of approval of agreements involving
trusts, inalienable interests, or interests of
third persons.
Procedure for securing court approval of compromise.

Collection of Personal Property by
Affidavit and Summary Administration Procedure
for Small Estates
Section
75-3-1201.
75-3-1202.
75-3-1203.
75-3-1204.

Collection of personal property by affidavit.
Effect of affidavit.
Small estates — Summary administrative procedure.
Small estates — Closing by sworn statement of
personal representative.
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

75-3-101. Devolution of estate at death — Restrictions.
The power of a person to leave property by will and the
rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are
subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this
code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon the
death of a person his real and personal property devolves to
persons to whom it is devised by his last will or to those
indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving lapse,
renunciation, or other circumstances affecting the devolution
of testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition,
to his heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for them in
cases involving renunciation or other circumstances affecting
devolution of intestate estates, subject to homestead allowance, exempt property and family allowance, rights of creditors, elective share of the surviving spouse, and administration.
1975
75-3-102. Necessity of order of probate for will.
Except as provided in Section 75-3-1201, to be effective to
prove the transfer of any property or to nominate a personal
representative, a will must be declared to be valid by an order
of informal probate by the registrar, or an adjudication of
probate by the court, except that a duly executed and unrevoked will which has not been probated may be admitted as
evidence of a devise if both:
(1) no court proceeding concerning the succession or
administration of the estate has occurred; and
(2) either the devisee or the devisee's successors and
assigns possessed the property devised in accordance with
the provisions of the will, or the property devised was not
possessed or claimed by anyone by virtue of the decedent's
title during the time period for testacy proceedings. 1988
75-3-103. Necessity of appointment for administration.
Except as otherwise provided in Title 75, Chapter 4, to
acquire the powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of
a personal representative of a decedent, a person must be
appointed by order of the court or registrar, qualify and be
issued letters. Administration of an estate is commenced by
the issuance of letters.
1975
75-3-104. Claims against decedent — Necessity of administration.
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a
decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced
before the appointment of a personal representative. After the
appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the
procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After distribution a
creditor whose claim has not been barred may recover from
the distributees as provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a
former personal representative individually liable as provided

75-3-707

UJNl^UKM rtiVDAirj

VUUUEJ

J.O«*

75-3-707. Duty of personal representative — Supple- part of the personal representative, is voidable by any person
interested in the estate, except one who has consented after
mentary inventory.
fair disclosure, unless:
If any property not included in the original inventory comes
to t h e knowledge of a personal representative or if the per(1) The will or a contract entered into by the decedent
sonal representative learns that the value or description
expressly authorized the transaction; or
indicated in the original inventory for any item is erroneous or
misleading, he shall make a supplementary inventory or
appraisement showing t h e market value as of the date of t h e
decedent's death of the new item or t h e revised market value
or descriptions, and the appraisers or other data relied upon,
if any, and file it with t h e court if the original inventory was
filed, or furnish copies thereof or information thereof to
persons interested in the new information.
1975
75-3-708.

D u t y of p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e — P o s s e s s i o n of e s t a t e .
Except a s otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every
personal representative h a s a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent's property, except that any real
property or tangible personal property may be left with or
surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto
unless or until, in the judgment of the personal representative, possession of the property by him will be necessary for
purposes of administration. The request by a personal representative for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or
devisee is conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir
or devisee for possession thereof, t h a t t h e possession of t h e
property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration. The personal representative shall pay
taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for t h e
management, protection, and preservation of, the estate in his
possession. He may maintain an action to recover possession
of property or to determine the title thereto.
1975

(2) The transaction is approved by the court after
notice to interested persons.
1992
75-3-713.

A person who in good faith either assists a personal representative or deals with him for value is protected as if the
personal representative properly exercised his power. The fact
that a person knowingly deals with a personal representative
does not alone require the person to inquire into the existence
of a power or t h e propriety of its exercise. Except for restrictions on powers of supervised personal representatives which
are endorsed on letters as provided in Section 75-3-504, no
provision in any will or order of court purporting to limit the
power of a personal representative is effective except as to
persons with actual knowledge thereof. A person is not bound
to see to the proper application of estate assets paid or
delivered to a personal representative. The protection here
expressed extends to instances in which some procedural
irregularity or jurisdictional defect occurred in proceedings
leading to the issuance of letters, including a case in which the
alleged decedent is found to be alive. The protection here
expressed is not by substitution for that provided by comparable provisions of the laws relating to commercial transactions and laws simplifying transfers^ of securities by fiduciaries.
"
1975
75-3-714.

75-3-709. P o w e r t o a v o i d transfers.
The property liable for t h e payment of unsecured debts of a
decedent includes all property transferred by him by any
means which is in law void or voidable as against his creditors,
and subject to prior liens, t h e right to recover this property, so
far a s necessary for the payment of unsecured debts of t h e
decedent, is exclusively in the personal representative. The
personal representative is not required to institute such an
action unless requested by creditors who must pay or secure
the cost and expenses of litigation.
1975
75-3-710.

P o w e r s of personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — I n
general.
Until termination of his appointment a personal representative h a s the same power over the title to property of the
estate t h a t an absolute owner would have, in trust, however,
for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the
estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing,
or order of court, unless otherwise specifically provided by this
COde.

1983

75-3-711. Improper exercise of power — Breach of
fiduciary duty.
If the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper,
the personal representative is liable to interested persons for
damage or loss resulting from breach of his fiduciary duty to
the same extent as a trustee of an express trust. The rights of
purchasers and others dealing with a personal representative
shall be determined as provided in Sections 75-3-712 and
75-3-713.
1975
75-3-712. Sale, encumbrance or transaction involving
conflict of interest — Voidable — Exceptions.
Any sale or encumbrance to the personal representative, his
spouse, agent, or attorney, or any corporation or trust in which
he has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction
which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the

P e r s o n s d e a l i n g w i t h personal representa-

tive — Protection.

Transactions a u t h o r i z e d for personal repre-

sentatives — Exceptions.
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by this code, by
the will or by an order in a formal proceeding and subject to
the priorities stated in Section 75-3-902, a personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested
persons, may properly:
(1) retain assets owned by the decedent pending distribution or liquidation including those in which the representative is personally interested or which are otherwise
improper for trust investment;
(2) receive assets from fiduciaries, or other sources;
(3) perform, compromise, or refuse performance of the
decedent's contracts that continue as obligations of the
estate, as he may determine under the circumstances. In
performing enforceable contracts by the decedent to convey or lease land, the personal representative, among
other possible courses of action, may:
(a) execute and deliver a deed of conveyance for
cash payment of all sums remaining due or the
purchaser's note for the sum remaining due secured
by a mortgage or deed of trust on the land; or
(b) deliver a deed in escrow with directions that
th2 proceeds, when paid in accordance with the
escrow agreement, be paid to the successors of the
decedent, as designated in the escrow agreement;
(4) satisfy written charitable pledges of the decedent
irrespective of whether the pledges constituted binding
obligations of the decedent or were properly presented as
claims, if in the judgment of the personal representative
the decedent would have wanted the pledges completed
under the circumstances;
(5) if funds are not needed to meet debts and expenses
currently payable and are not immediately distributable,
deposit or invest liquid assets of the estate, including
moneys received from the sale of other assets, in federally
insured interest-bearing accounts, readily marketable se-
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therein shall, in addition to an award of costs as otherwise
provided, recover from the losing party therein such sum as
counsel fees as shall be allowed by the court The official bond
of any such officer shall be liable for any such costs and
attorney fees
iM3
78-11-11. Submitting controversy without action.
"Parties to a question in difference, which might be trie
subject of a civil action, may without action agree upon a case
containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and
present a submission of the same to any court which would
have jurisdiction if an action had been brought But it must
appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and that the
proceeding is m good faith, to determine the rights of the
parties The court must thereupon hear and determine the
case and render judgment thereon as if an action were
pendmg
i»*3
78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or
death upon death of wrongdoer or injured
person — Exception and restriction to out-ofpocket expenses.
(1) (a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence
of another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer
or the injured person The injured person or the personal
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a
cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general
damages, subject to Subsection (lXb)
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a result of a cause other than the injury
received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of
the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of
that person are entitled to receive no more than the
outrof-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of tfrat
injured person as the result of his injury
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died may
recover judgment except upon competent satisfactory evidence
other than the testimony of that injured person
lWi
78-11-12.5. Proceeds received by criminals as result of
crime — Delivery to Division of Finance —
Trust fund — Distribution to crime victims —
Custody and control — Sale of real property
and securities — Definitions — Accused mentally ill — Notice — Return to accused —
Reimbursement for legal defense of indigent
accused.
(1) Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity contracting or otherwise arranging
with any person accused or convicted of a crime in this state,
the representative or assignee of that person, or any other
person or entity, to provide information regarding that person
with respect to the reenactment or fictionahzation of that
crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article, radio or
television presentation, live entertainment of any land, or
from the expression of that person's thoughts, feelmgs, opinions, or emotions regarding the crime, shall pay or deliver to
the Division of Finance for deposit m the Crime Victims'
Reparations Trust Fund any proceeds which would otherwise,
by terms of the contract or other arrangement, be owing
directly or indirectly to that person who is accused or convicted or his representatives or assignees The Division of
Finance shall deposit the proceeds in the trust fund for the
benefit of and payable to any victim of crimes committed by
that person if
(a) the person is eventually convicted of a crime based
on the facts upon which the reenactment or nationalization is based, and
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(b) the victim brings a civil action within six years of
the date the trust account has been established, an<j
recovers a money judgment against the person or representative
(2) (a) Where more than one victim establishes a claim
against the proceeds, the court shall apportion the proceeds equitably, among all the, victims who obtain, acaoa^y
judgment
(b) The court may make a partial or full distribution of
the proceeds prior to the six-year statute of limitations
provided in this section
(c) At any point in the proceedings where a victim is a
minor under state law, the court shall appoint a guardian
ad litem to petition the court for a conservator under Title
75, Chapter 5, Part 4, to protect that minor's interests in
the trust account
(3) Proceeds deposited in the trust fund shall be invested in
accordance with Title 51, Chapter 7, State Money Management Act of 1974 The Division of Finance shall deposit
investment income in the trust fund and reinvest earnings for
the fund
(4) When the compensation to the person convicted of the
crime is of a nature that it cannot be placed in a trust account,
the Division of Finance assumes custody, title, or possession of
the property for benefit of and payable to any victim of the
crime For purposes of this section, the date the Division of
Finance assumes custody is considered the date a trust
account is established
(a) Where the proceeds are real property, the Division
of Fmance shall, as soon as practicable after taking title to
the property, obtain at least three mdependent appraisals
of the value of the property and then make a good faith
effort to sell the property for at least the amount of the
lowest appraisal If the real property has not been sold
within two years after receipt, the Division of Finance
shall sell it to the highest bidder at public sale in
whatever city m or out of the state affords m his judgment
the most favorable market for the property mvolved He
may declme the highest bid and reoffer the property for
sale if in his judgment the bid is insuigcient If m his
judgment the probable cost of sale exceeds the value of the
property, it need not be offered for sale
(b) Securities listed on an established stock exchange
may be sold only at prices prevailing at the time of sale
and may be sold over the counter or by any other method
the Division of Finance considers advisable
(c) The purchaser of property at any sale conducted by
the director of the Division of Fmance pursuant to this
chapter takes the property free of all claims of the owner
or previous holder of the property and of all persons
claiming through or under them The director shall execute all documents necessary to complete the transfer of
ownership
(5) For purposes of this section
(a) "Convicted person" includes a person found not
guilty as a result of the defense of mental illness pursuant
to Section 76-2-305
(b) "Person convicted of a crime" mcludes any person
convicted of a crane committed in this state either by
entry of a plea of guilty or by conviction after trial, and
any person who has voluntarily and knowingly admitted
the commission of a crime for which the person is not
convicted
(c) "Proceeas" mclude property or other compensation
(d) "Victim" means a person who suffers personal,
physical mental, or emotional injury, or pecuniary loss, as
a direct result of the crime, or the legal representative
acting on behalf of the victim

ADDENDUM "B"

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF
MARJORIE S. SIMS
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, MARJORIE S. SIMS, of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah,

being of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not

acting under duress or influence of any kind, 60 make anc declare
this document to be my Last Will and Testament*
ARTICLE I
I hereby revoke all former or other Wills or Codicils
previously made by me at any time.
ARTICLE II
I hereby order and direct that the expenses of my last
illness, bjrial and funeral expenses, estate and

inheritance

taxes, and all my other just debts and obligations, be paid and
dischargee as soon as this can con v o n : e n t 1 y be c o n c- =!' ter m y
death.
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ADDENDUM "C"

RLED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 H 1991
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF
GEORGE GRANT SIMS
I, GEORGE GRANT SIMS, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah,
* v^
being of* sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make and
publish this, my Last Will and Testament.
ARTICLE 2
REVOCATION OF PRIOR WILLS AND CODICILS
I hereby revoke all other wills and codicils heretofore made
by me.

ARTICLE Tl
WIFE AND BENEFICIARIES
I am married to MARJORIE S. SIMS (hereinafter referred to as
"my wife").

The beneficiary of my estate will be my wife (either

outright or in trust, or both, as hereinafter set forth) or, if
she predeceases me, the beneficiaries of my estate shall be the
individuals named or indicated in Article V.
ARTICLE III
PAYMENT OF TAXES, DEBTS AND EXPENSES
I direct that all of my due and unpaid debts, all expenses
of my last illness, burial, and the administration of my estate,
and all taxes due at the date of my death or as a result of my
death, shall be paid as soon after my death as practical.

Ms

ARTICLE .IV
BEQUEST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EFFECTS
I hereby give, devise and bequeath
tangible personal property

certain

items of my

to those persons in the manner set

forth in a written statement or list which has been, or which
will be, prepared, dated and signed by me and attached to this
Will and which statement or list I intend to be in existence at
the time of my death.

Said lirt describes the items devised and

the devisees thereof.

All of the rest and residue of my personal

effects, including all household furniture and contents, jewelry,
automobiles, and the like, I leave to my wife if she survives me.
However, if my wife predeceases me, all of my personal property
and effects not set forth in the attached list shall become a
part

of

the

residue

of

my

estate

and

be

disposed

of

as

hereinafter set forth.
ARTICLE V
BEQUEST OF RESIDUE OF ESTATE
If my wife survives me, my personal representative shall
divide the residue of my estate into two parts,

hereinafter

referred to as Part A (the "GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX
TRUST") and Part B (the "MARJORIE

S. SIMS

MARITAL

BYPASS

DEDUCTION

PORTION") each ascertained as hereinafter set forth in Article
VIII.
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The M a r j o r i e S.
distributed

as

Sims

soon

o u t r i g h t and t r e e of

after

Marital

Deduction Portion

my d e a t h

as

practical

to

shall
my

be

wife

trust.

The George Grant Sims E s t a t e Tax Bypass T r u s t s h a l l be held
i n Trust by t h e T r u s t e e s h e r e i n a f t e r
wife

during h e r l i f e t i m e .

w i t h o u t any c o n d i t i o n s ,
Trustees s h a l l

named f o r the b e n e f i t of my

The T r u s t e e s

a l l of

the

also distribute

shall

income of

a s mu^h of

necessary for her proper h e a l t h ,

distribute

support/

said

t o her

trust.

The

the p r i n c i p a l as

is

and maintenance and

to

m a i n t a i n her i n the s t a n d a r d ot l i v i n g

t h a t s h e e n j o y e d during my

lifetime.

t h e T r u s t e e s h a l l pay

Upon t h e d e a t h o f my w i f e ,

the following persons,

the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i f i c

to

sums:

$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o DONALD E. SMITH, MD
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o MARK MUIR, MD
The T r u s t e e
in the f o l l o w i n g

If

any o f

then deceased,

shall

then d i s t r i b u t e

the r e s i d u e of t h i s

Trust

manner:
ONE-THIRD:

ELNA MITCHELL

ONE-THIRD:

NEIL MITCHELL

ONE-THIRD:

LINDA WOOD

the above i n d i v i d u a l s ,

e x c e p t LINDA WOOD,

are

h i s o r h e r s h a r e s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d t o h i s o r

h e r i s s u e by r i g h t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .

As t o LINDA WOOD, i f

s h o u l d be d e c e a s e d a t t h e t i m e of my d e a t h ,

3

t h e n her share

she
shall

be d i s t r i b u t e d

t o IAN MITCHELL and-AMY MITCHELL, i n e q u a l

shares.

I f my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s m e , t h e r e s i d u e of my e s t a t e s h a l l b e
distributed

to:

DONALD E.

SMITH,

MD.

and

MARK MUIR,

MD.,

$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 e a c h a n d t o ELNA MITCHELL, NEIL MITCHELL a n d LINDA
WOOD, o n e - t h i r d
predecease

me,

representation.

each,
then
If

s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d

but
to

if

any of

his

or

them,
her

e x c e p t LINDA WOOD,

issue

LINDA WOOD p r e d e c e a s e s

by

right

me, t h e n h e r

t o IAN MITCHELL and AMY MITCHELL,

of

share

in

equal

shares.
ARTICLE VI
COMMON DISASTER
I n t h e e v e n t my w i f e a n d I d i e u n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s
it

cannot

be

properties

determined

o t my e s t a t e

were t h e l a s t t o

which
shall

of

us

were

first

be a d m i n i s t e r e d

to

that

die,

all

a s t h o u g h my w i f e

die.
ARTICLE V I I
APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARIES

1.

A p p o i n t m e n t of P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e .

w i f e t o b e P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f my W i l l .

I a p p o i n t my

I f my w i f e

does

n o t s u r v i v e me o r i s o t h e r w i s e u n a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g t o s e r v e
personal representative,

t h e n I a p p o i n t my nephew, NEIL MITCHELL,

t o s e r v e a s c o - p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of my e s t a t e .
event

both

are

unable

as

or

unwilling

4

to

serve

as

In t h e
Personal

Representative of my Will, the Personal Representative shall be
IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL.
2.
MITCHELL,

Appointment of Trustees.

I appoint my wife and NEIL

to be the co-trustees of the George Grant Sims Estate

Tax Bypass Trust created under this Will.

In the event either

Trustee is unable or unwilling to serve, the other of them shall
serve as Trustee.

In the event both are unable or

serve, the other of them shall serve as Trustee.

unwilling to
In the

^vent

both are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the Trustee
shall be IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL.
3.

Appointment of Guardian and Conservator.

In the event I

become incompetent during my lifetime, I direct that my wife be
appointed the guardian of my person and the conservator ot my
estate.

If she is unable or unwilling to serve, I direct that

NEIL MITCHELL be appointed guardian and conservator or, if he is
unable or unwilling to serve, then IAN MITCHELL, his son shall
serve as the sole guardian and conservator.
conservator shall serve without bond.

My guardian and

I direct that as long as

there are funds available I be taKen care of in my home and not
placed in a nursing home or similar facility unless home care is
impossible because of the nature of the care required.

It is my

desire and direction that whatever funds are necessary be spent
for my support, care and maintenance without regard or concern

5

<?Q£

for

conserving

beneficiaries

any

portion

of

my

estate

for

subsequent

'thereof*
ARTICLE V I I I

ASCERTAINMENT OF GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS TRUST
AND MARJORIE S. SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION PORTION,
If

my w i f e s u r v i v e s m e , P a r t A a n d P a r t B a s s e t

A r t i c l e V s h a l l be a s c e r t a i n e d

1.

as

forth

in

follows:

There s h a l l f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d t h e value of tay g r o s s

e s t a t e (including property not administered in my e s t a t e ) for the
purpose of the United States Federal E s t a t e Tax.
2.

There

s h a l l be deducted from such value the amount, to

the e x t e n t a l l o w a b l e as a d e d u c t i o n in t h e c o m p u t a t i o n of the
Federal E s t a t e Tax, of a l l funeral

and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

expenses,

and a l l claims a g a i n s t my e s t a t e but there s h a l l not be deducted
any e s t a t e , i n h e r i t a n c e , t r a n s f e r , legacy or s u c c e s s i o n t a x e s ,
referred to in A r t i c l e I I I .

The amount so d e t e r m i n e d s h a l l be

paid out pursuant to A r t i c l e I I I above.
3*

Part A s h a l l be equal to the amount ( c u r r e n t l y $600,000)

that may pass free of Federal E s t a t e Tax by reason ot the Unified
Credit Against Tax under S e c t i o n 2010 of the I n t e r n a l Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (or i t s successor) reduced by the total
of (1) a l l items includable in my e s t a t e for f e d e r a l e s t a t e tax
purposes which are disposed of in previous Articles ot this Will

a&£

or which pass outside of this Will but only if such items do not
qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction or the
federal estate tax charitable deduction, and (2) the amount of
any administration expenses claimed as income tax rather than
estate tax deductions.

Part A shall be held, administered and

distributed as set forth in Article V.
For purposes ot allocating my residuary estate between Part
A and Part B, all property owned by me at the time of my death
shall be valued at the same value that was used for federal
estate tax purposes.

If I should die possessed of any terminable

or other

which

interest

cannot

quality

for

the

"marital

deduction" under the Federal Estate Tax law, such interest shall
be allocated to this Part A.

If there are any federal or state

estate and inheritance taxes due and payable on my death, they
shall be paid out of the toregoing assets allocated to Part A.
No estate taxes shall be paid out of Part B.
4.

Part B shall consist ot the rest, residue and remainder

of my estate not disposed of pursuant to the foregoing provisions
of my Will.

I hereby direct that whenever possible, assets that

will qualify for the federal estate tax "marital deduction" shall
be allocated to Part B after, however, Part A is properly funded.
If there

are

assets

that

will

not

qualify

for the

marital

deduction I direct that those assets be allocated, to the extent
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p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t exceeding t h e l i m i t s s e t f o r t h above, t o P a r t A
above.

I f t h e r e a r e a s s e t s t h a t w i l l c a u s e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on

P a r t A t o be exceeded,

t h o s e a s s e t s s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o P a r t B

although they w i l l not q u a l i f y for the m a r i t a l deduction.

The

d e c i s i o n of my P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e a s t o t h e p r o p e r t y t o be
a l l o c a t e d t o P a r t A and P a r t B s h a l l be f i n a l and c o n c l u s i v e and
binding upon a l l b e n e f i c i a r i e s .

However,

t o P a r t B s h a l l h a v e an a g g r e g a t e
representative

of

the appreciation

fair

the property
market

or d e p r e c i a t i o n

allocated

value- c l e a r l y
in t h e

value

t o t h e d a t e of d a t e s of e a c h d i s t r i b u t i o n of a l l p r o p e r t y
a v a i l a b l e for d i s t r i b u t i o n .
any e s t a t e ,

inheritance,

then

P a r t B s h a l l n o t be d i m i n i s h e d by

transfer,

d u t i e s , e i t h e r s t a t e or f e d e r a l .

legacy or succession taxes

or

I f t h e v a l u e of my r e s i d u a r y

e s t a t e i s l e s s t h a n t h e amount t h a t may be a l l o c a t e d t o P a r t A
( c u r r e n t l y $600,000),

no p a r t o£ my e s t a t e s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d

to

P a r t B.
ARTICLE IX
TRUSTEE POWERS
Trustee
discretions

s h a l l have t h e a d d i t i o n a l
set

forth

i n P a r t 4,

powers,

Chapter 7,

authorities,

and

Title

the

75 of

Uniform T r u s t e e s 1 Powers P r o v i s i o n s of

the Utah Uniform

Code

incorporated

(or

its

successor),

which

reference*
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are

Probate

herein

by

I , GEORGE GRANT SIMS,

the T e s t a t o r ,

instrument t h i s J j . ^ d a y of J u l y ,

1991,

sign

my name t o

and b e i n g f i r s t

this
duly

s w o r n , do hereby d e c l a r e t o the u n d e r s i g n e d a u t h o r i t y t h a t I s i g n
it willingly

( o r w i l l i n g l y d i r e c t a n o t h e r t o s i g n f o r me), t h a t I

execute

as

expressed

it
in

my f r e e

it,

and v o l u n t a r y

and t h a t

act

I am e i g h t e e n

for

the

purposes

( 1 8 ) y e a r s of

age

or

o l d e r , of sound mine, and under no cc(n?stp*aint or urjj^ue ijnf^Lyence.

GEORGE GRANT SIMS, T e s t a t o r
WE, t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , a s w i t n e s s e s , s i g n our names
t h i s instrument, being f i r s t

duly s w o r n , and do hereby d e c l a r e

the undersigned a u t h o r i t y that the T e s t a t o r
this

to
to

s i g n s and e x e c u t e

i n s t r u m e n t as h i s L a s t W i l l and T e s t a m e n t and t h a t he s i g n s

i t w i l l i n g l y and t h a t each of u s ,

i n t h e p r e s e n c e and h e a r i n g

of

t h e T e s t a t o r and or e a c h o t h e r , h e r e b y s i g n s t h i s W i l l as w i t n e s s
t o the T e s t a t o r ' s s i g n i n g ,

and t h a t t o t h e b e s t of

the Testator

of

is

18 y e a r s

under no c o n s t r a i n t o r undue

s&

age o r o l d e r ,

of

our knowledge

sound m i n d ,

and

influence.
ADDRESS

NAME

*& ^ T J w

^2.KZ-

S^<^L^

^LjU,

y&

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
) SS.
STATE OF UTAH )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o betore me by GEORGE GRANT SIMS,
the T e s t a t o r ,

or,

and s u b s c r i b e d

£./c<L/Ati F- ov£/ern>ti
witnesses,

this

ai
md

and sworn t o b e f o r e

MArVfoJ £

me by

TJXA/A/

J?<% day of J u l y , 1991.

My Commission Expires:

-y-y*/

NOTAR^r^SrfcK—*TCCT^p7^Tf
Res la | ng^^t^v.
Re
h^>^^c r n c

:

^fg^W
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

IN THE MATTER OP THE ESTATE
OF:

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
:

CASE NO. 933900278

MARJORIE S. SIMS,
:

Deceased.

The above-referenced matter is before the Court on reciprocal
Motions for Summary Judgment.

The petitioner, Neil Mitchell, as

successor personal representative of the Estate of G. Grant Sims,
originally filed his Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an Order
from this Court that the original personal representative of the
Estate of G. Grant Sims, prior to her demise, failed to act in
accordance with Mr. Sims' Will in funding a bypass trust, and was
therefore required to return to Mr. Sims' Estate certain funds
which the petitioner believes were inappropriately used by Mrs.
Sims.

Inasmuch as Mrs. Sims is deceased, the petitioner seeks

repayment from the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims.
The

Estate

representative

of

Marjorie

Lynda

Wood,

S.

Sims,

through

has

filed

in

its

response

personal
to

the

aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment, a counter Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking from this Court an Order that the Estate
of G. Grant Sims is not entitled to repayment of sums used by Mrs.
Sims during her lifetime in her capacity as personal representative

SIMS ESTATE

PAGE TWO

of Mr. Sims' Estate.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims does agree,

however, that certain cash funds retained by Mrs. Sims while she
was acting as personal representative of the Estate of Mr. Sims
should be returned and has offered to return $48,100 of the
$52,875.40 that the petitioner claimed was not deposited into Mr.
Sims' Estate accounts. The difference between the $4 8,100 and the
$52,875.4 0 are outlined in the Memoranda filed by Mr. McCoy on
behalf of Lynda Wood, personal representative of the Marjorie S.
Sims Estate, and have not been challenged as being inappropriate by
the petitioner.
While it is without dispute in this matter that Mrs. Sims as
personal representative did not fund the trust as her deceased
husband's Will provided, the manner in which she used the funds
were, as a matter of law, funds that she would have been entitled
to receive had she funded the trust as Mr. Sims' Will provided. The
terms of the trust would have allowed Mrs. Sims to receive the
funds

she

took,

without

any

depletion

of

her

own

funds.

Accordingly, while there was a technical breach of her fiduciary
responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in
no damages and therefore is not actionable.
The intent of Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than
conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries.

That purpose was

PAGE THREE
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adhered to by Mrs. Sims, albeit not in strict compliance with the
formal procedures his Will required.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the Estate
of Marjorie Sims has no obligation to repay the Estate of G. Grant
Sims, with

the

exception

of the

$48,100 which

the personal

representative of Marjorie Sims has offered to return heretofore.
As those funds should properly be with the Estate of Grant Sims,
the Estate of Marjorie Sims is to repay that amount to his Estate
forthwith.
There is a question regarding funds received by Mrs. Sims in
her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims' Estate for
personal injury and a subsequent settlement after Mr. Sims died.
The evidence is undisputed that the personal injury claim arose
before Mr. Sims' death, but was settled after his death.

The

applicable statutory provisions provide that the only claims that
survive a death are claims for expenses related to the injury,
where the death of the personal injury claimant is not related to
the personal injury claim.

The settlement was for $12,445.86, and

as it was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it was for actual
expenses incurred by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury,
and pursuant to statute is required to be paid over to the personal
representative of the deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate, or the heirs

SIMS ESTATE
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of the deceased if a death was intestate•

As Mr. Sims did not die

intestate, the funds were properly paid to Mrs. Sims in her
capacity as personal representative, and should have been deposited
in the accounts for the Estate, the funds representing expenses
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury
case.
Accordingly, the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims is also required
to repay the Estate of G. Grant Sims the sum of $12,445.86,
representing

an

improper

diversion

of

the

personal

injury

settlement funds received by Mrs. Sims after her husband's death.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court has granted the Summary
Judgment of the petitioner, Neil Mitchell, in part as it relates to
the personal injury settlement funds, and has granted the Summary
Judgment of the personal representative of the Marjorie S. Sims
Estate in part.

The Court determines that the amounts to be paid

from Marjorie S. Sims Estate to the G. Grant Sims Estate of $4 8,100
is not subject to this Summary Judgment, even though the Order
should contain a requirement for such payment based upon the fact
that

said

sums

have

been

offered

and

outstanding

for

some

substantial period of time and have not really been at issue.
Counsel for the parties are to confer and determine the manner
in which an appropriate Order encompassing the decisions of this

SIMS ESTATE
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Court on the reciprocal Motions for Summary
drafted.

Judgment can be

Inasmuch as the Court has partially granted each Motion

for Summary Judgment, the Order needs to provide that an approval
as to form, or the participation in the preparation of an Order
encompassing the Court's rulings on these reciprocal Motions for
Summary Judgment does not constitute a waiver of either side to
object and pursue an appropriate appeal in relation to the Court's
ruling contained in the Order.
' Once the Order has been properly prepared and approved by both
sides as being reflective of this Court's decision, the same should
be submitted to the Court for its reviev/and signature pursuant to
the Code of Judicial Administration.
Dated this

/-^dav of March/ 1995

'TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
I CERTIFY THAT THIS JS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH.

J^JQJV—
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the

A-

foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this A — ) day of
March, 1995:

John L. McCoy
Attorney for Personal Representative
Lynda Wood
310 S. Main, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
John E. Gates
Kim R, Wilson
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Neil Mitchell
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P-O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
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JOHN E. GATES (A1169)
KIM R. WILSON (A3512)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, Successor
Personal Representative of the
Estate of G. Grant Sims
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Of
MARJORIE S. SIMS,

Probate No. 933900278 ES
Timothy R. Hanson

Deceased.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Neil R. Mitchell
("Mitchell"), as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate
of G. Grant Sims (the "Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking
allowance of Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of
Claim and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Lynda Wood as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims (the
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking denial of Mitchell's
First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim came on for hearing
pursuant to notice, before the above-entitled court, the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on January 13, 1995, at
2:00 p.m. and Kim R. Wilson appeared for Mitchell and John L.
McCoy appeared for Wood, and the Court having considered the

motions, the memoranda and affidavits supporting and opposing the
motions and the files and records herein, having heard arguments
of counsel, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated March 13,
1995, which is incorporated herein by reference, and being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Mitchell's entitlement to payment of the sum of

$48,100.00 is not contested, and Wood, be and the same is hereby
directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of $48,100.00
together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, until paid
at the statutory rate of 10% per annum.
2.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and

denied in part.
3.

The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in

part and denied in part.
4.

In addition to the amounts provided in Paragraph 1,

Mitchell's claim is approved and allowed in the sum of $12,445.86
and Wood is directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of
$12,445.86 together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993,
until paid, at the statutory rate of io% per annum.
5.

Recovery is denied for all other amounts sought in

Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim.

-2-

In accordance with Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court determines that there is no just reason for
delay, and this Order is deemed to be a tjnial
DATED this

"--—- of
-° 4 u n X /
QQ day

judgment.

, 1995.

'imothy R. Hanson_
District Court Judg^1 ^

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN-N& M&KTINEAU

t^-Ui

'Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell,
Successor Personal Representative
of the Estate of G. Grant Sims

j^hn L. McCoy

ttorney for Lynda Woo^r Personal
Representative ofthe Estate
of Marjorie S/Sims
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3. Wills <3=>684.2(4)
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Karl F. LINDGREN, Deceased.
No. 94-238.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs Oct. 13, 1994.
Decided Nov. 23. 1994.

Testamentary trust created to provide
for generous care and support of settlor's
wife, for purpose of caring for wife from time
of settlor's death to her own death, was
solely liable for wife's nursing home care
expenses from day of settlor's death, as well
as complete funeral burial expenses for wife,
notwithstanding wife's personal assets.
L Wills c=>4*6

Conservator for testamentary trust beneficiary petitioned for order requiring trustee
to pay beneficiary's nursing home care and
for beneficiary's burial and funeral costs.
The Fifth Judicial District Court, Jefferson
County, Frank M. Davis, J., ordered trust to
pay one half of beneficiary's cost but refused
to order reimbursement of costs or expenses
from time following settlor's death and denied conservator's request for attorney fees.
Appeals were taken. The Supreme Court,
Weber, J., held that: (I) under terms of
trust, trustee was obligated to pay for expenses incurred by beneficiary from date of
settlor's death, but (2) conservator was not
entitled to attorney fees absent statutory or
contractual authority.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Trieweiler, J., specially concurred and
filed opinion in which Gray, J., joined.

1. Appeal and Error ^1008.1(5)
Supreme Court reviews district court's
findings as to whether they are "clearly erroneous"; that is whether findings are supported by substantial evidence, whether district court correctly apprehended evidence,
and whether reviewing court is left with firm
conviction that mistake has been made.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

When wording of will is clear and unambiguous, court shall not consider extrinsic
evidence or circumstances surrounding execution of will.
5. Costs ^194.16
Attorney fees cannot be awarded in absence of statutory contractual authority, or
bad faith or malicious behavior.
ti. Trusts c=>377
Conservator for testamentary trust beneficiary was not entitled to attorney fees
incurred in suit to compel trustee to pay for
expenses incurred by beneficiary for nursing
home care and funeral and burial costs given
that there is no statutory or contractual authority for award of fees, and trustee's actions were neither bad faith nor malicious
behavior, as needed for equitable award of
fees.

John T. Jones, Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, Billings, for appellant.
Gene A. Picotte, Helena, for respondent.
WEBER, Justice.
This is an appeal from a probate order
issued by the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Jefferson County. We reverse in part and
affirm in part.

2. Appeal and Error C=>842(2)

WTe consider the following issues on appeal:

Supreme Court's review of conclusions
of law is simply whether conclusions are correct.

I. Did the District Court err in ordering
the Trustee to invade the Trust estate to
the extent of paying one half of Anna D.

MATTER OF ESTATE OF LINDGREN
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Lindgren's monthly health care and housing costs?
II. Did the District Court err in denying
the Conservator's request for reimbursement of the nursing care and housing costs
that Anna D. Lindgren's conservatorship
incurred prior to June 1, 1994?
III. Did the District Court err in ordering the Trustee to invade the Trust estate
to pay one-half of Anna D. Lindgren's
burial and funeral expenses?
IV. Did the District Court err in denying
Conservator's request for attorney fees?
Karl F. Lindgren (hereinafter Decedent)
ed on April 15, 1993, in Lewis & Clark
ounty, Montana. Decedent's will estabihed a Trust in which his surviving spouse,
i Alzheimer sufferer, is the sole beneficiary
ereinafter referred to as Beneficiary.),
le Trustee of the Trust is Decedent's cous, Gladys E. Tellessen (hereinafter referred
as Trustee.) The purposes of the Trust
e to "provide for and assure so far as
>ssible, the generous care and support" of
^nefkiary during her lifetime and to pay
r her burial and funeral expenses.
On August 2. 1993, the Thirteenth Judicial
strict Court, Yellowstone County, appointPatsy A. Martin (hereinafter referred to
Conservator), daughter of Beneficiary-, to
rve as the guardian and conservator for
meficiary, due to her deteriorating condi>n. Beneficiary resides in a Billings nursy home and incurs $3,000 per month nursl care expenses. Conservator has requestthat the Trustee of the Testamentary
" rr.t* m-nitniy '.'uiv '»i Beneiiciary. Iru.-r- •s refused all buch requests for aid because
weficiary has failed to establish a financial
ed.
Conservator petitioned the probate court
• an order requiring the Trustee of Karl
ndgren's Testamentary Trust to distribute
:ome and/or principal from the Trust to
y for Beneficiary, Anna D. Lindgren's
rsing care, medications, and expense^.
z(\ *h<j n^titi^r -^ucrht roimHn^.iiYtorif f >•

the funds Conservator had expended on the
care of Beneficiary since the death of Mr.
Lindgren.
The court issued its findings and order on
April 22, 1994. That order ruled that the
Trustee must invade the Trust to pay for
one-half of Anna Lindgren's monthly health
care and housing costs and one half of her
burial and funeral costs. Also, in that order
the court denied the request for reimbursement of Beneficiary's expenses from the time
period of her husband's death to June 1,
1994. Finally, the court denied Conservator's request for attorney fees.
Conservator filed a Notice of Appeal on
May 18, 1994; she amended, and refiled the
appeal on May 24, 1994. Trustee filed a
Notice of Cross-Appeal on June 1, 1994.
I
Did the District Court err in ordering the
Trustee to invade the Trust estate to the
extent of paying one half of Anna D. Lindgren's monthly health care and housing
costs?
Conservator argues that tne wording of
the Trust makes it clear that the Trust was
supposed to assume the expense of Beneficiary's care and support following the death of
Karl Lindgren. Conservator contends that
the Trustee abused her discretion by refusing all requests for help.
The respondent Trustee argues that the
word ''Necessary" in the Trust means that
Beneficiary must expend her own funds before the Trustee invades the Trust.
nuitni \>rWili.
1. The term of this Trust is from the time
of my death to the time of death of my
wife, ANNA DELL LINDGREN. If said
wife shall not survive me, this Trust shall
not come into existence.
2. The sole beneficiary of this Trust is my
said wife, ANNA DELL LINDGREN. *
3. The purpose.s of this Trust are to pro•Sfio r ,*• ITH a^^ ,rv ^* *"'*' * 'is r>»>s^iMe. th°
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generous care and support of my said wife.
ANNA DELL LINDGREN, after my
death for so long as she shall live and to
provide for funeral, burial, and any other
expenses attendant upon and resulting
from her death.
4. The Trustee shall, in her. his or its
sound discretion, pay t<> or apply for my
said wife as much of the Trust income and
Trust principal as Trustee deems necessary for her support, care and health during her life time. The discretion of the
Trustee shall be exercised liberally in favor
of my said wife, it being my intention that
she shall have, in addition to the necessities, a reasonable number of the luxuries of
life, if she desires them.
5. The Trustee shall have all of the powers, duties, and obligations set forth and
described in Sections 72-21-101 through
72-21-206, MCA. Any other powers, obligations and duties in any other applicable
laws of the State of Montana are also
conferred upon the Trustee.
6. Upon the death of my said wife after
my death, this Trust shall terminate and
the Trustee shall, with deliberate speed,
convert the Trust property entirely to
cash, and after payment of all debts and
obligations of the Trust if any, distribute
absolutely and unconditionally all thereof
to the beneficiaries and in the amounts and
proportions designated and determined by
the provisions of Paragraph SEVENTH,
hereinafter.
[1,2] This Court reviews a district
court's findings as to whether they are clearly erroneous; that is whether they are supported by substantial evidence, whether the
court correctly apprehended the evidence,
and despite the satisfaction of the first twTo
concerns, whether we are still left with a firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.
Tonack v. Montana Bank of Billings (1993),
258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d 326. The Supreme
Court's review of a district courts conclusions of law is simply whether the conclusions are correct. Weber v. Rivera (1992),
255 Mont. 195, 841 P.2d 534.

[3] The court found that the discretionary provisions of the Trust justified the
Trustee in denying Conservator's request for
contribution to Beneficiary. The court found
that there was no "need" for the Trust to be
invaded. Having said this, however, the
court went on to determine that the true
spirit and intent of the will had been contranicted. The court then charged the Trust
with one half of Beneficiary's future expenses
and one half of her future funeral and burial
expenses. The court denied retroactive contributions from the Trust concerning Mrs.
Lindgren's care upon her husband's death
and also denied Conservators request for
attorney fees.
[4] The District Court specifically points
to the word "need" and roots its decision
there. The Court should determine the testator's intent, the ruling concern, by analyzing the will in its entirety, not select provisions on their own. Matter of Estate of
Evans (1985), 217 Mont. 89, 704 P.2d 35. In
analyzing the entire Trust as a whole, we are
left with the firm conviction that Karl Lindgren carefully worded the instrument to carry out the specific purpose of caring for his
wife from the time of his death to her own
death. If the wording of the will is clear and
unambiguous, the court shall not consider
extrinsic evidence or the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. Matter of
Estate of Greenfield (1988), 232 Mont. 357,
757 P.2d 1297.
What the District Court did was to set the
word "need" above the intent of the Trust.
That one word cannot be construed in such a
way as to negate or even diminish the sole
purpose of the Trust which was to provide
Mr. Lindgren's beloved wife with monetary
support for both necessities and luxuries during her life and for funeral and burial expenses upon death. We will not interpret
the liberal Trust language by way of a limited reading of the word "necessary," referred
to by the court as "need." The Trust does
not itself contain any limiting language.
While the Trust states that the Trustee has
sound discretion it also directs the Trustee to
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exercise that discretion "liberally" in favor of
Mrs. Lindgren. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Trustee adopted this
liberal attitude toward the care of the Beneficiary. The Trustee denied every request for
help from Mrs. Lindgren's Conservator.
The denial was not in compliance with the
purposes of the Trust.
The Trustee would have us determine that
Mrs. Lindgren must expend or dispose of her
personal estate before the Trust can be invaded. The Trust does not provide for the
expenditure of Beneficiary's estate before
any payments are to be made from the Trust.
We will not read into the instrument this
limitation. Nor will we consider case law
from other jurisdictions when the Trust instrument itself is clear.
We can reach no other conclusion than that
the Trust itself is clearly worded to provide
for Mrs. Lindgren's total care from the time
of Mr. Lindgren's death until Mrs. Lindgren's own death. Therefore, it is the Trust
itself that is solely liable for Mrs. Lindgren's
care from the day her husband died. We
hold that the District Court erred in ordering
the Trustee to invade the Trust estate to the
extent of Da vine
half of Anna D. Lindcren's monthly health care and housing costs.
We reverse the court order requiring the
Trust to pay for only half of Mrs. Lindgren's
expenses and direct the District Court to
enter an order for the Trustee to pay for
Mrs. Lindgren's total living and medical expenses.
II
Did the District Court err in denying the
••nser.'iitorV request for reimbursement of
;•.- r.ui-.-.ne care ana housing costs that Anna
D. Lindgren s conservatorship incurred prior
to June 1, 1994?
r

In its April 22, 1994 order the court directed the Trustee to pay for one half of Mrs.
Lindgren's expenses beginning after June 1,
1994. Appellant argues that she should be
reimbursed for the money she spent from
her mother's personal finances on her moth-

er's care before June 1, 1994. Respondent
merely argues that Mrs. Lindgren's funds
must be consumed before the Trust begins.
Again, we emphasize that the clear language of the Trust states that it begins "from
the time of my death to the time of death of
my wife, ANNA DELL LINDGREN."
Therefore, the testators clear intent is that
the Trust begin at his death. Because the
Trustee failed to pay for any of Mrs. Lindgren's expenses in the manner in which the
Trust directs, the court erred in refusing to
reimburse Mrs. Lindgren's Conservator.
We reverse the court's refusal to reimburse the Conservator for funds expended
heretofore on Mrs. Lindgren's care. The
court is directed to order the Trustee to
reimburse the Conservator for all monies
already spent for the care of Mrs. Lindgren
from the date of Mr. Karl Lindgren's death.

Ill
Did the District Court err in ordering the
Trustee to invade the Trust estate to pay
one-half of Anna D. Lindgren's burial and
funeral expenses?
In addition to requiring the Trust to pay
for half of Mrs. Lindgren's expenses, the
court ordered the Trust to pay for half of her
burial and funeral expenses. Appellant argues that the Trust provided for the complete payment of Mrs. Lindgren's funeral
and burial expenses.
According to paragraph 3 of the Testamentary- Trust, the Trustee has no discretion in
paying Mrs. Lindgren's complete funeral and
burial expenses. We hold that the District
Court fired n: spliuini: the cost benve«-i; the
parties. We reverse the District Court's ruling on this issue and direct the court to issue
an order that the Trust will be fully responsible for all burial and funeral expenses.
IV
Did the District Court err in denying Conservator's request for attorney fees?
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Appellant argues that the court should
have awarded her attorney fees because she
had to file this action in order to force the
Trust to begin its prescribed duties. Respondent argues that in absence of a special
statute, or stipulation of the parties, or rule
of court, that attorney fees cannot be awTarded.

In Godfrey v. Chandley (1991), 248 Kan.
975, 811 P.2d 1248, the decedent established
a testamentary trust for the benefit of his
surviving spouse. In that trust, he provided
that net income of the trust was to be paid to
the beneficiary " 'as may be necessary for
her support, health and maintenance.'"
Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1250 (emphasis added).

L5, 6J The District Court denied aiturntn
fees. In this, the court was correct. The
longstanding rule in Montana is that, absent
statutory or contractual authority, attorney
fees will not be awarded. Goodover v. Lindeys (1992), 255 Mont. 430, 843 P.2d 765.
There is no statutory or contractual requirement for an award of attorney fees.

ucuuc, ub we are, wnether the oeneilciary
was entitled to the trust income for her
support, health, and maintenance without regard to her personal income. The remainderman named in the will argued that the
term "necessary" limited expenditures from
trust income to "only those expenses wThich
exceeded [the beneficiary's] personal income." Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1251. However, in concluding otherwise, the Supreme
Court of Kansas set forth the following rules
of interpretation:

In certain instances in which bad faith or
malicious behavior are involved, this Court
has made an equitable award of attorney
fees. Goodover, 255 Mont, at 446, s43 P.2d
at 771-75. However, this equitable confederation is only invoked infrequently. Goodover, 255 Mont, at 446, 843 P.2d at 775. The
record does not show either bad faith or
malicious behavior. We affirm the denial of
attorney fees.
TURNAGE, C.J., and HARRISON,
HUNT and NELSON, JJ., concur.
TRIEWEILER, Justice, specially
concurring.
I concur with the result of the majority
opinion, but for reasons other than those set
forth in that opinion.
Paragraph 4 of Karl Lindgren's testamentary trust directed the trustee to pay from
trust income and principle those expenses
"necessary for her [Anna's] support care,
and health during her lifetime." (Emphasis
added.) The issue in this case is simply
whether the term ''necessary" describes the
type of expenses to be paid for, or .Anna's
financial need that those expenses be paid by
the trust.
This issue has been resolved in other jurisdictions based on reasoning and precedent
that I conclude is persuasive.

Whether a trustee can con>ider the personal income of a trust beneficiary is to be
determined from the language of the instrument and surrounding circumstances.
See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 811, p.
229 (rev. 2d ed. 1981). Where the trust
settlor manifests an intention that the
trust property be applied to the beneficiary's support only if and to the extent the
beneficiary is in actual need, then the beneficiary is not entitled to support from the
trust fund if other sufficient resources are
available. See Dunklee v. Kettering, 123
Colo. 43, 46, 225 P.2d 853 (1950); First
National Bank of Catawba County v.
Edens, 55 N.CApp. 697, 704, 286 S.E.2d
818 (1982). See generally 2 Scott on
Trusts § 128.4 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1987).
On the other hand, where a settlor directs
the trustee to pay the beneficiary so much
as is necessary for support and maintenance, an inference arises that the settlor
intended the beneficiary to receive support
from the trust estate, regardless of other
income. See Taylor v. Hutchinson, 17
Ariz.App. 301, 304-05, 497 P.2d 527 (1972);
Estate of Wells v. SanfordL Trustee, 281
Ark. 242, 246-47, 663 S.W.2d 174 (1984);
Hamilton Nat Bank v. Childers, 233 Ga.
427, 428, 211 S.E.2d 723 (1975); In re
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Coots Trust 581 S.W.2d 392, 393-96 (Mo.
App.1979): see Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 128, comment e (1957).
Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1251.
For these reasons, the Kansas Court held
as follows:
We hold the trustee shall pay Peggy support, health, and maintenance for the period of her natural life irrespective of her
individual income. The testator obviously
intended to provide maintenance for his
wife for her life. His provision is limited
only by what is necessary. In other
words, it cannot be used to provide nonessential items.
Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1253.

at a minimum, those expenditures related to
Anna's support, housing, and health care
during her lifetime. The term "necessary,"
as used in Karl's testamentary trust, does
not refer to Anna's ability to pay for those
expenses from her own financial assets.
For these reasons, I specially concur with
the majority's conclusion that the trustee is
obliged, under the terms of Karl Lindgren's
testamentary7 trust, to pay for Anna Lindgren's total living and medical expenses from
and after the date of her husband's death.
I also concur with the majority's conclusions under Issues III and IV of its opinion.
GRAY, J., joins in the foregoing
concurring opinion.

The same interpretation of the word "necessary," as it described expenditures from a
testamentary trust, was applied in Rentier v.
Costellano (N.J.Super.Ct.Ch.Div.1952), 21
NJ.Super. 331, 91 A.2d 176, 180, where that
court held that:
The word "necessary" as used here in
the first paragraph, considered with the
context, and in the light of the surrounding
circumstance^ refers to what is> required
to accomplish testator's intention, namely,
the comfortable maintenance and care of
his widow, the scope, the range, and the
cost of it. Without doing violence to every
other expression in the will, it could not be
said that the benefaction was conditional
upon the widow's financial ability to support and maintain herself. Cf. Camden
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Read, 124
NJ.Eq. 599, 4 Aild 10 (Ch.1939), in which
it was held that the word "necessary" did
r->! reie r to zht r>erier"L-.an - .nabi]itt» in
meet the expense of certain stated contingencies.
In accord is Estate of Wells v. Sanford
(1984), 281 Ark. 242, 663 S.W.2d 174, 176-77.
Based on the above authority, I conclude
that the term "necessary," as used in Paragraph 4 of Karl Lindgren's testamentary
trust, refers to the type of expenditures the
trustee is authorized to incur. Thev include.

Jack J. HALVERSON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,

Shirley J. TURNER and Harold Turner,
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>jpir-v '" ur, '»: M^ntuii^.
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Dominant estate owner brought action
against owners of servient estate, seeking to
judicially establish existence of road easement over -anient estate. The Thirteenth
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Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309, and Haar- 1. Executors and administrators <§=>5I
Under wrongful death statute providstitch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70
Utah 552, 262 P. 100, will not be further ing that action may be maintained by deceextended to situations except where they dent's heirs or his personal representatives
are clearly applicable. As hitherto ex- for the benefit of his heirs the Legislature
pressed in a former decision, I have doubt indicated that the proceeds obtained from
whether those cases did not present facts the wrongdoer should not be intermingled
which warranted their submission to the with other assets of the estate of the deceased. U.C.A.1943, 104—3— l l . 1
jury.

KIT I I M I t t STSTD4>

10 re BEHM'S ESTATE.
BEHM v. GEE.
No. 7305.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 20, 1950.

2. Death C=>I0I
Under the wrongful death statute the
recovery must be distributed in proportion
to the losses suffered by different heirs.
U.C.A.1943, 104—3—11.
3. Death <£=>I0I
Where decedent left no estate and husband had expended approximately $1,600
for expenses of the last illness and burial
purposes, the husband was at least entitled
to recover the amount expended for burial
purposes, and in view of the fact that he
is made liable by statute for expenses of
the last illness the same principle should
apply to such expenses. U.C.A.1943, 104—
3—11.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of
Venna Darlene Behm, on petition of Alma
Gee, personally and as administrator of the 4. Assignments C=»26
estate of Venna Darlene IVhm, d^r-oasod,
A hu-naihi's interest in any recovery
for appnnal of final account and distribufor wrongful death of the wife was assigntion of tho funds remaining in his p()>vssion, to which objections were fm'd ly Kd- able. U.C.A.P'43, ln4—3—ll.
ward C. I.ehm.
5. Assignments C=>48
The Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County. A. II. Ellett, J., enteral a
judgment adverse to petitioner, and petitioner apj>ealed.
The Supreme Court, Latimer, J., held that
objectant'b assignment of his interest in any
recovery that might be had against doctor
for wrongfully causing death of deceased
was valid and that the court erred in directing the clerk of the court to pay objectant's
counsel a stated attorney's fee and that on
a retrial the trial judge should determine
the rel-itive !<><s(^ suffered ; v [he riut-' h".:^
and piuud" for a distributi-wi mi a p»-.;purtioiiate IKIMS and award objectant's share
to petitioner.
Reversed.
See also 213 P.2d 664.
I. Morrison v. Perry, 104 Ftah 151. 140
P.2.d 772; Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific
Ky. Co., Ptah, 1S6 P.2d 29.]; Pool v.
Southern Pac. Co., 7 Utah 303, 26 P.
213 P.2<i—\2

A court of equity will enforce an assignment of one's interest in proceeds of
ciaim against a tort-feasor even though
the cause of action is not assignable.
6. Assignments C=>I37

Finding that assignment of husband's
interest in proceeds of action for wrongful
death was procured by fraud was not
sustained by the evidence. U.C.A.1943,
104—3—11.
7. Appeal ?nd f r G r
Trial C=396'2)

^!0l0i!)

Trial court's conclusion that assignment of husband's interest in proceeds of
action for wrongful death was barred because champertous could not be sustained
654: Evans v. Oregon Short Line K. Co..
37 Utah 431, 108 I\ 638. Ann.C;is.l912C.
259; Chilton v. Union I'ac. Ky. Co., 8
Utah 47, 29 P. 963.
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where the issue was never pleaded and
evidence was insufficient to establish such
contention. U.C.A.1943, 104—3—11.

sentative capacity.
11.

U.C.A.1943, 104—3—

8. Trial <§=*396(l)
Shirley P. Jones, Salt Lake City, Lewis
The Supreme Court must liberally Larson, Manti, for appellant.
construe pleadings, but the findings as
Ray S. McCarty, Salt Lake City, C. Vermade should be within the framework of
non Langlois, Salt Lake City, for respondthe petition as originally drawn or as
ent.
amended, and there should be evidence to
-upper: them.
LATIMER, Justice.
9. Assignments <©=355
Venna Darlene Behm died in childbirth
Where husband was unwilling to de- on February 18, 1947, leaving a husband
vote time and money to prosecution of and two infant daughters surviving her.
claim for wrongful death of wife and his She was the wife of respondent Edward C.
father-in-law undertook the prosecution of Behm and the daughter of appellant Alma
such claim without any assurance of re- Gee. While appellant believed the attendturn, an assignment of husband's interest ing doctor was liable for his negligent
in the amount of recovery was supported treatment of deceased, the respondent apby adequate consideration.
U.C.A.1943, parently concluded there was little chance
104—3—11.
of recovering from the doctor or else he
did not desire to invest his time and money
10. Death C=>I0I
In proceeding which involved the dis- in litigation, as he was willing ro permit
tribution of proceeds of settlement of appellant to become the principal actor
claim for wrongful death, where husband in this family tragedy. As a result of rehad assigned his interest in proceeds, trial spondent's attitude, it was largely through
court erred in awarding husband's attor- the efforts of appellant that suit was instiney fee, since husband had no interest in tuted against the physician for his alleged
the award and the proceeds were no part negligent treatment of the deceased and
of the estate, and estate which had not a settlement effectuated.
been benefited in any respect should not be
Respondent, who claims to have been
burdened with litigation between the dis- mentally upset by the death of his wife
tributees. U.C.A.1943, 104—3—11.8
and not entirely cognizant of the things
he was doing, concluded that appellant
11. Assignments €=392
would be a proper person to represent the
An assignor cannot depreciate an asfamily in their litigation and that so long
signment by merely saying that he does not
as he, appellant, would proceed with the
want the fund he is assigned, and the asdetails, there was little need of respondent
signee can complain if he is denied reconcerning himself with the matter. Accovery on his assignment.
cordingly, on April 11, 1947, respondent
12. Assignments <§=*)2
joined in a petition to have appellant apWhere husband assigned any interest pointed administrator of the estate of rehe might have in proceeds of claim for spondent's deceased wife. On the same
wrongful death and the assigned was ap- date, respondent joined in a petition to
pointed administrator of the estate and have appellant appointed guardian of the
procured a settlement of such claim, the estates of the two minor daughters with
loss sustained by the husband by reason authority to settle and compromise any
of such death should be awarded to the claim they might have against the physician
assignee in full settlement of all claims of for the death of their mother. Pursuant to
assignee, including any claim he irr.ght the petitions, appellant was appointed adassert for services rendered in his repre- ministrator of the estate of his deceased
2. In re Yonks Estate, Utah, 204 P.2d 452.
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daughter and guardian of the estates of respondent's interest, and two-thirds to
the granddaughters. Prior to the hearing himself as guardian of the estates of the
on these petitions and on or about April two minor children.
28, 1947, respondent executed a written
Respondent filed his objections to this
assignment in which he assigned to appel- account and the grounds used as the basis
lant any interest he might have in and to for his objections were substantially the
any sum that might be recovered from the same as those set forth in his previous petidoctor.
tion to invalidate the assignment, namely,
On January 7, 1948, appellant as admin- fraud in procuring the assignment and unThere were some other
istrator petitioned the court for authority assignability.
to settle the claims of the heirs for the grounds mentioned but they are of no
sum of $15,000 and for authority to pay materiality to this decision as they deal
his attorney a proportionate part of the principally with appellant's competency to
recovery. The court issued an order in act as guardian for the infants, and anaccordance with the prayer of the petition other suit deals with that litigation. Howand thereafter a settlement was effectuated. ever, there is one allegation made by reThe draft given to appellant for final settle- spondent touching on his claim to part
ment cleared through clearing house chan- of the proceeds which is of importance.
nels and on January 28, 1948, appellant This allegation is to the effect that responddeposited the money to his credit in his ent expended the sum of $1652 for excapacity as administrator. No further pro- penses of his wife's last illness and burial
ceedings appear in the file until April 23, and that the court should take this element
1948, although the transcript shows that a into consideration in determining the
dispute arose between appellant and re- amounts to be distributed to the surviving
spondent and that between the date of the heirs. The prayer of the petition was
settlement and April 23, 1948, respondent couched in the following language: "That
consulted with counsel who in turn dis- the court enter its order distributing the
cussed compromise solutions with counsel $11,250.00, together with interest thereon,
for appellant. No agreement was reached to the respondent as the surviving husband
during these discussions, so on the latter and to the two surviving infants, taking indate respondent filed a petition in which he to consideration the expenditures made by
requested the court to issue an order re- respondent and the physical and mental
quiring appellant to show cause as to why condition of the children/'
he should not immediately distribute the
The petition for final distribution and
funds in his possession, and to further show
cause why the court should not declare the the objections thereto came on for hearing
pretended assignment executed by respond- before the court below. The trial judge
ent as being null and void. In substance, originally confined the testimony to the
the grounds alleged in the petition for de- issues pleaded but as the trial progressed
feating the assignment were, unassignabil- and the breach between the litigants widity and fraud in inducing appellant to ex- ened the issues became vagrant and wandering. While the findings of fact and
ecute the instrument.
conclusions of law deal with the first and
:;i:ai accouiii: of appellant and the distribuby appellant but these were overruled. Ap- tion of the funds remaining in his possespellant then filed his final account and sion they contain many statements ano.
petition for approval and distribution of conclusions which might be very material
the funds remaining in his possession. in a subsequent and properly pleaded action
Passing over the incidental expenditures to remove appellant as administrator, but
included in the a .count appellant requested for the purposes of this suit are far outauthority to p'±y an additional attorney's side the framework of the pleadings. We
fee and an administrator's fee and to dis- make this observation not in any way of
tribute the remaining sum in three equal criticism but only so the parties will know
parts, one-third to himself as assignee of whv we do not relate all of the facts touch-
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ing on appellant's improper handling of the
funds after he was informed respondent
was contemplating legal action.
Discarding what we believe to be immaterial, there remain four important questions to be answered: (1) Did the trial
court err in holding that proceed? obtained
fr-'in third pernor.- :" - . « - • ' * ' •'• ^hs
^r~ ..^w ^.wv/ibuted tu ;!*<- _jr\:v;::^ ncirs
in the same proportions as are the assets
of an estate in the absence of a will?
(2) Did the court err in holding respondent's anticipated portion of the recovery
was not assignable? (3) If so, did the
court err in holding the assignment was
void because of fraud, champerty and no
consideration? And (4) Did the court err
in directing the clerk of the court to pay
respondent's counsel a stated attorney's
fee? We treat the questions in the order
stated.
This appears to be the first time this
court has been presented with the necessity of determining the appropriate distribution to heirs of the proceeds realized
from a claim for wrongful death. Generally speaking there are two methods used
by courts when making such a distribution.
The first is in accordance with the particular statutes on descent and distribution in
probate proceedings. The second is by a
proportional method, the proportion being
determined by the loss suffered by each
heir. We adopt the latter method.
Section 104—3—11, U.C.A.1943, insofar
as pertinent, provides as follows : " * * *
when the death of a person not a minor is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may
maintain an action for damages against
the person causing the death. * * * In
every action under this and the next preceding section such damages may be given
as under all the circumstances of the case
may be just."
[1] In keeping with the provisions of
this section, suit can be instituted either
by the heirs themselves or by the personal
representative of the deceased for the benefit of the heirs. The wording of this section compels a conclusion that the legis-

lature intended that the proceeds obtained
from the wrongdoer would not be intermingled with other assets of the estate
of the deceased. Otherwise, the cause of
action would have been vested in the personal representative alone and the amount
recovered would have been subjected to
administration :>y him m the sam • ma:.r.«jr
For many years this court has confirmed
the principle that the statutory beneficiaries
take separate and apart from the estate.
The funds may pass through the hands of
the personal representative but the cause
of action is a new cause which runs directly to the heirs. In Morrison v. Perry, 104
Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, 780, we said:
" * * * Under our wrongful death statute, 104—3—11, R.S.U.1933, the law does
not seek to punish the wrongdoer, but
simply to compensate the heirs for the
loss sustained. (Citing cases.) It ;s undisputed in the evidence that deceased's
widow paid 5819.40 for funeral services
and that this amount was reasonable.
There is, however, no evidence that the
estate was insolvent, nor was there evidence to show whether or not the widow
made a claim against the estate for reimbursement, or whether or not she was in
fact reimbursed from the estate. If the
widow was reimbursed from the estate was
she damaged in this particular? The answer is obviously no, if we keep in mind
that the estate is separate and distinct from
the plaintiff or the statutory
beneficiaries
in this action. The estate may be damaged
to that extent but the estate is not a party
under our death statute.
(Citing cases.)
* * * This court in the case of Mason
v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 24
P. 796, held that the death statute, 10-1—3—
11, of the R.S.U.1933, was not a survival
statute but that it created a new cause of
action in the heirs.'* (Italics added.)
Again in the recent case of Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., Utah, 186 P.2d
293, 303, the rule is in the following language: "Appellants rely on the cases of
Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77,
24 P. 796, and Hailing v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78, which, in
substance, hold that a claim for death is
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a separate and independent cause of action proceeds should be divided. Besides the S
and is not a continuation of the right of financial support furnished by deceased to
action of the injured party for personal his or her family, the loss of affection,
injuries. The death creates a new cause of counsel and advice, the loss of deceased's
action for the loss suffered by the heirs care and solicitude for the welfare of his
by reason of death, and only comes into or her family and the loss of the comfort
and pleasure the family of the deceased
existence upon the happening of death."
Appellant in effect concedes this rule but would have received are all matters to be
directs our attention to the wording of considered in assessing damages recoverSection 104—3—11, U.C.A.1943, supra, and able under 104—3—11, U.C.A.1943. Pool v.
particularly the phrase "for the benefit Southern Pac. Co., 7 Utah 303, 26 P. 654;
of his heirs." He contends that even Evans v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 37
though the estate may not be interested Utah 431, 103 V . 638, Ann.Cas.l912C, 259;
in the recovery, still the personal repre- Chilton v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 8 Utah
sentative brings the action for all heirs 47, 29 P. 963.
and the wording of the section indicates
[2] The ultimate would be to distribute
^ legislative intent t o have the heirs bene- to each heir a share which would be in
m to the same extent and in the same exact proportion to the loss each had sufproportion as they inherit under the pro- fered. This is not possible of accurate asbate code. This argument loses much of certainment but the individual's losses can
its force when all parts of the section are be determined within reasonable limits and
considered and the elements of damages re- relative proportions fixed. T o distribute
coverable in a death suit are given weight. the fund in proportion to the losses suffered
The section provides that the damages re- makes the allocation more consonant with
coverable are those which under all the the underlying theory of damages. In cercircumstances may be just. If we were tain instances a trial judge might conclude
to consider the immediate family as a unit, that the distribution provided for by the
under appellant's theory, each heir would statutes of descent and distribution closely
suffer damages in the same proportion as approximate the losses suffered by the heirs
he receives under the probate code. Such and make distribution on that basis. But
a division might permit an heir who suf- we see no good reason why he should be
fered little to recover a Mibstannal Mim su limited in all cases.
and conversely require an heir who had
[3] While the trial judge announced
suffered a great deal to accept a mere pittance. In some instances the statutory sound principles we do not believe he apdivision might accurately reflect the rela- plied them correctly in this case. We
tive damages suffered. But in many in- quote the conclusion of law adopted in the
stances it would not and in those instances court below. "That because of the fact
that Edward C. Behm does not require or
great injustices would be the resiiit.
need any of the recovery and because of
It is no answer XO S3X Cijat injustices the condition of arrested development and
exist in the statutory m«thod.V distributing the needs of the minor children, to-wit:
estates. The legislature in providing for Venna Julene Behm and Darlene Behm,
succession in th^ £&s*n,C<e. o f a will pre- the said Edward C. Behm is not entitled
scribed for distribution without regard to to any order awarding him part of said
1 sse? suffered by the ind:\iJu. 1 he:r-\ ' ;•: r^j • r\.
V
. - :.:^ u-« »1 :>y :^e •: u *:
::: wrun^fii death cascb a uifteix::: nu:n<>
i\
- c '::C' -: :: .."-j only ^;_rt of the
is imphec. which has a tendency to elimi- appropriate ones. We have already disnate some of the claimed unfairness of cussed in detail some of the elements which
the succession statutes.
determine the damages suffered and the
Perhaps if we enumerate some of the corresponding distribution co the one who
elemei^ts of damages that can be recovered has been damaged. It may be that rein wrongful death cases we will get a spondent's loss is considerably less than the
better picture of the manner in which the minor daughters' but a surviving husband's
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actual damages cannot be reduced to such
an extent that he fails to get any awarcf.
Respondent pleaded and proved that he
paid approximately $1600 for expenses of
the last illness and burial purposes. The
record establishes that the deceased left no
estate and consequently respondent was
required to pay these expenses without any
possibility of recovering them from her
estate. These were part of the damages
alleged in the death suit and must have
been considered when settlement was made.
Under the rule announced in the case of
Morrison v. Perry, supra, respondent was
at the least entitled to recover the amount
expended for burial expenses and we believe that when he is by statute made legally liable for expenses of the last illness
the same principle should apply. To reduce
his interest in the recovery below the
amount he so expended would deny him
the right to recover the sum he was legally
required to pay as a result of the wrongdoer's negligence.

Chancellor's liberal enforcement of such
assignments, the judges presiding in courts
of law agreed to uphold assignments of
contingent interests having a potential realization at the time of the assignment.
Modern courts, however, have adopted
the more liberal equitable rule enforcing
assignments of things not in esse but mere
iuture possibilities so lone r.s the assignments are fairly made i~: _;: _; .-quate
consideration without offending against
public policy. Thus assignments of future
contractual interests, anticipated interests
in real or personal property, future wages
or the expectancy of an heir in the estate
of an ancestor have all been repeatedly
upheld by modern decisions.
[5] Courts have adopted the same rule
where one who has sustained personal injuries assigns such proceeds as may possibly be recovered by him in an action
brought against the tort-feasor. Moreover,
a court of equity will enforce the assignment even though the cause of action is
not assignable. Richard v. National Transportation Co., 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S.
870; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Ackley,
58 Ul.App. 572, reversed on other grounds,
171 111. 100, 49 N.E. 222, 44 L.R.A. 177;
Hutchinson v. Brown, 8 App.D.C. 157;
Schubert v. Herzberg, 65 Mo.App. 578;
Pittsburg, C , C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Volkert, 58 Ohio St. 362, 50 N.E. 924. In the
first cited case, the injured person assigned
to a hospital a share of any proceeds he
should acquire from any settlement or judgment to be paid by the tort-feasor. The
court recognized that under the law of the
state of New York the cause of action
was non-assignable, but held that the assignment of a share of the proceeds was
enforceable in equity: The court said [158
Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 872] :

[4] We conclude that respondent's portion of the death claim is assignable.
Respondent's contention is that such a holding would overrule those cases in which
this court had held that a cause of action
for wrongful death is non-assignable. Had
respondent attempted to assign a cause of
action for death then the cases cited would
have been controlling. However, appellant
assigned not the cause of action, but rather, assigned any interest he might have in
the recovery. While at first blush this
may appear to be a distinction without a
difference, upon closer examination it becomes apparent that there is a real and
substantial difference. The cause of action cannot be split up between the heirs
but the amount recovered can be and is.
The problem thus presented is this. Can
an heir, after a cause of action has arisen
"Unless prohibited by public policy or
in which he has an interest make an as- statute, the paper signed by McManus was
signment of his interest?
a valid assignment of the proceeds. The
Much has been said by courts in the past fact that at the time the instrunent was
regarding the assignability and non-assign- executed all that the assignor posseted was,
ability of contingent interests at law and a chose in action—a cause of a c t n n ^ S ?
in equity. Lawr courts originally refused personal injuries—did not in itself render
to recognize assignments of contingent in- the assignment of the proceeds an ab:olute
terests of any kind. Later, because of the nullity.
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"The existence of the cause of action
gave a potential existence to the proceeds;
the potential existence of the proceeds
gave an equitable existence to the assignment.
" T h e fact that there was no fund then
in existence, or any claim which could then
be enforced by action, did not prevent the
instrument taking effect as an equitable
assignment.' * * *
"To rule that I cannot assign the cause
of action, but that I can transfer 100 per
cent, of its proceeds sounds anomalous. It
is tantamount to saying that I can transfer
the substance but must retain the shell;
that I can give you the right to the recovery, but I must hold the right to recover.
"However, repeated precedents of many
years' standing tell us this is the law.
• * * " (Italics added.)
Under the rules announced, the assignment by respondent of the proceeds, if
any, that should be recovered from the
malpractice suit instituted by appellant, is
valid and enforceable.
• [6] The trial court's general finding of
fraud cannot be sustained. It is extremely
doubtful that the allegations of the petition
are sufficient to raise this issue. But assuming they are, the evidence is insufficient to
sustain any such finding. Any evidence
suggesting misconduct on the part of appellant covers activities during the period subsequent to the assignment. We mention
this assignment of error merely because
of a rinding by the trial judge that he found
generally all issues of fact in favor of respondent and against appellant. Undoubtedly as a result of this finding both parties
have argued this issue before this court.
[7, 8] We are unable to sustain the trial
court's conclusion that the assignment was
void because champertous. This issue was

petition as originally drawn, or as amended, and there should be evidence to support
them.
[9] Respondent's contention that there
was no consideration for the assignment is
not sustained by the record. By statute,
respondent was entitled to be appointed administrator of his wife's estate and could
institute the action in this representative
capacity. He was also entitled to be appointed guardian of the estates of his two
daughters. Appellant was not required to
assume the burden of either appointment.
There were no assets of the estate or of
the guardianships other than the claim
against the doctor and apparently respondent was not disposed to become the active
party in prosecuting a suit of such doubtful value. Whether or not he was unwilling to risk his time or money or both for
such a purpose does not appear. But there
can be no question but what he was perfectly willing to permit his father-in-law
to assume the burden, finance the litigation
and take all the risks. The record conclusively establishes that appellant spent
some time and some money in prosecuting
the action with beneficial results. Maybe
the expenditures were not large but the investment was made without assurance of
any return. Moreover, they directly benefit respondent whether he obtains possession of any money now or whether it is
subsequently expended for the benefit of
his daughters. Appellant performed services for the benefit of respondent which
he, appellant, was not legally liable to do,
and it does not lie in the mouth of respondent to say that the detriments suffered by
appellant were so insignificant that they
will not support the assignment of a claim
which respondent considered of little or no
value.
F101

The award of attornev's fees is

sun.Cient
establish
Even after a discussion in court that the individuals who might be interested in the
question might be of importance, no re- fund: Appellant, respondent, and the two
quest was made to amend the pleading so infant daughters. However, only three can
as to place it in issue. While we liberally recover as heirs, or heirs and assignee. Reconstrue pleadings, the findings as made spondent was denied any recovery by the
should be within the framework of the trial court unless the attorney's fees be
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considered as an award to him. Assuming ment of all claims by appellant including
the minors have had their interests in- any claim he may assert for services in
creased by the trial court's ruling that re- his representative capacity.
spondent should not prevail, their estates
Reversed. Costs to appellant.
should not be depleted to finance respondent's suit to recover his claimed portion
PRATT, C. J., and W O L F E , W A D E
of the fund.
The an: eilant cannot he <\nd M c D O X O l X H , J J., concur.
char.;-- 1 v/ith the fees >o that either respondent was given a partial recovery or
the court had in mind charging the estate. To charge the estate would be inconsistent with the court's ruling that the
proceeds go to the heirs and do not become
assets of the estate. Moreover, the estate
has not been benefited as this litigation is
over distribution of the assets. The estate
BEHM'S ESTATE et al. v. GEE.
should not bear the burden of litigation
No. 7333.
between distributees. See In re Yonk's EsSupreme Court of Utah.
tate, Utah, 204 P.2d 452. The award cannot be sustained as being a charge against
Jan. 20, 1050.
respondent's portion as this is hostile to the
Proceeding in the matter of the guardfinding that he was not entitled to particiianship of the estate of Venna Julene Behm
pate.
and Cheryl Darlene Behm, on petition of Edward C. Behm that Alma Gee, guardian, be
[11] Respondent now asserts that he is
removed.
not complaining because the court failed
The guardian made a motion to dismiss
to award him a part of the recovery and
the petition, and the Third Judicial District
that appellant is not a party who can comCourt, Clarence E. Baker, J., entered a judgplain. This assertion hardly warrants an- ment removing the guardian, and the guardswering. An assignor cannot depreciate ian appealed.
the assignment by merely saying he does
The Supreme Court, Latimer, J., held that,
not want the fund he assigned and the as- since the matter was pending on a motion to
signee can complain if he is denied re- dismiss, judgment of removal was premacovery on his assignment.
turely made.
Judgment reversed with directions to perThe trial judge in his disposition of the
mit
the guardian to file appropriate pleadcause attempted to conserve the maximum
ings if he so elects.
amount of the estate for the infant survivors and this should be the objective of 1. Guardian and ward C=>25
all parties to this litigation. Much as we
Where there was a petition that guardmight like to accomplish this desirable re- ian be removed and guardian made a mosult, except in those cases where the evi- tion to dismiss the petition, removal of
dence shows that a husband did not suffer guardian was error even if there was an
any damage, pecuniary or otherwise, we admission showing that guardian did not
cannot deny him his right to participate in properly appreciate his duties as trustee,
the recovery. Accordingly, the judgment and the only appropriate order that could
must be reversed.
have been entered was one denying the motion to dismiss and granting the guardian
[12] In a retrial the trial judge should
a reasonable time to answer. U.C.A.1943,
determine the relative loss suffered by the
102—6—1.
three heirs and provide for distribution on
a proportionate basis. Respondent's por- 2. Guardian and ward <S=*25
tion should be awarded to appellant. The
The court may remove a guardian at
amount awarded should be in full settle- any time upon a proper showing, irrespec-
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with provisions of the Employment Security
Law, and those provisions which treat real
estate salesmen as employees for purposes of
the real estate laws should not be construed
as making them employees for purposes of
the unemployment laws.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY OF WYOMING, a corporation,
and Becky Boehler, Appellants (Defendants
below),
v.
Donald B. FINKBINER, Harold R. Flnkblner, and Dorothy E. MacDougall, Appellees (Plaintiffs below).
Oonald B. FINKBINER. Harold R. Finkbiner, and Dorothy E. MacDougall, Appellants (Plaintiffs below),
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY OF WYOMING, a corporation,
and Becky Boehler, Appellees (Defendants
below).
Nos. 3458, 3459.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
July 1, 196&

Declaratory judgment action for construction of provisions of trust brought
by remaindermen against trustee and life
beneficiary of trust. The District Court,
Laramie County, Rodney N. Guthrie, J.,
rendered judgments interpreting the trust
The trustee and life beneficiary and remainderman appealed. The Supreme Court,
Gray, J., held, inter alia, that requirement
by trial court that trustee investigate and
determine extent to which principal of trust
created by husband for benefit of wife
should be invaded so that payments of principal would not result in increase of wife's
personal estate was improper because requirement fixed amount of payments to

be made in future by standard not imposed
upon trustee by grantor.
Judgment affirmed as modified.

1. Trusts <3=>M9
Trust instrument that gave trustee
power in its sole discretion to advance to
wife oi grantor from rime :o 'line such portions of the principal of said trust fund as
in its judgment may be necessary for her
proper care and support was ambiguous
and grantor's will and codicil should have
been admitted in declaratory judgment action brought by remaindermen of trust for
construction of trust instrument to show
surrounding circumstances at time trust
was created.
2. Appeal and Error €=1056(5)
Exclusion of grantor's will and codicil
from evidence in trust remaindermen's declaratory judgment action to construe invasion clause of trust instrument was not
prejudicial to remaindermen where trial
court gave consideration to circumstances
surrounding the creation of trust in construction and interpretation of trust.
3. Trusts Q=>\ 12, 276
In interpreting trust and determining
powers of trustee to invade principal for
benefit of life beneficiary, intent of grantor
is controlling.
4. Trusts <S=»276
Grantor's intention in granting power
to trustee to invade principal for benefit
of life beneficiary is to be ascertained, it
possible, from the context of the trust instrument as a whole.
5. Trusts <&=II2
Every word of trust is to be given effect if that can be done without defeating
general purpose of the trust.
6. Trusts <3=>II8

If intention of grantor does not readily
appear from trust instrument, language used
is to be read in light of surrounding circumstances at time trust was executed.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. TINKBINER
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7. T r u s t * <S=M 12

13. Trusts <S=>276

Narrow and unreasonable construction
of trust that would defeat the purpose intended by the grantor will not be adopted.

Once ascertained, trust grantor's intention in creation of trust must govern,
provided result reached is not contrary to
law.

Requirement by trial court that trustee
investigate and determine extent to which
principal of trust created by husband for
benefit of wife should be invaded so that
payments of principal would not result in
increase of wife's personal estate was improper because it fixed amount of payments
to be made in future by standard not imposed upon trustee by grantor.

% Trusts € » l 12

14. Trusts 4=3278

$[ Provisions of trust treated by husband
Siat conferred benefits upon his wife are
JO be construed liberally in her behalf.

Power granted to trustee to "advance"
to wife of grantor from time to time portions of the principal of the trust fund was
authority for trustee to pay such amounts
ta grantor's wife and not direction that
trustee make loans to beneficiary.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

ft. Trusts<S=>ll2

10. Trusts <S=»276

Husband's purpose in creating trust
for benefit of wife with power in trustee
JO invade principal "for her proper care
tnd support" was to assure that bis wife
vould not have to rely solely on income of
rust and property left her by will for her
iupport.
f l . T r u s t s <S=>276

Grant of power to trustee in its sole
iiscretion to advance to wife of the grantor
Tom time to time such portions of the prin:ipal of said trust fund as in its judgment
nay be necessary for her proper care and
iupport and in the exercise of discretion
he trustee "shall be liable to no one" was
'rant of broad powers to trustee to adminiser trust limited only to extent that trustee
vould not employ its discretion recklessly or
n a manner that would frustrate the granor's intent.
% Trusts <&»276

Grant of power to trustee to invade
irincipai of trust created by husband for
icncfit of wife "as may be necessary for
ter proper care and support" did not reiuire the trustee to inquire into wife's asets and that her assets be exhausted in
rhole or in part before payments could be
lade from principal.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett and
Frederick G. Loomis, Cheyenne, for appellants and appellees.
Kline & Tilker and Arthur Kline, Cheyenne, for appellees and appellants.
Before PARKER, C. J., and HARNSBERGER, GRAY, and McINTYRE, JJ.
Mr. Justice GRAY delivered the opinion
of the court.
Plaintiffs, as the remaindermen of an inter vivos trust, commenced an action for a
declaratory judgment and other relief
against the bank, as trustee, and against
Becky Boehler, 1 as the life beneficiary,
claiming that the trustee was administering" the trust in violation of the rights of
:he remaindermen. The nasis of plaintiffs'
claim to a large extent is dependent upon
the power conferred upon the trustee by
a provision in the trust authorizing the trustee to invade principal for the proper care
and support of Becky. The joint answer
and counterclaim of the defendants also
requested the court to construe such provision and determine the rights, duties, and
legal relation of all the parties to the ac-

I. To avoid confusion we shall usually he :after refer to this defendant as "Becky."
416 P.2d—15
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tion. The judgment entered by the trial
court failed in certain respects to satisfy
either the plaintiffs or the defendants and
as a consequence both parties have appealed.
The facts essential to a general understanding of the controversy are not in dispute. The trust was created in the year
1929 by John Huckfeldt. Becky was his
wife. They had married in the \ear 1918.
Turning to the pertinent provisions of the
trust instrument, we discover it was first
directed that the net income of the trust
should be paid to Becky. It was then provided that upon her death the accumulated
income and principal were to be paid to his
sister, Alma Finkbiner, and in the event
of her death prior to termination of the
trust the proceeds were to be distributed to
her surviving children, who are now the
plaintiffs and the remaindermen. It was
further provided, and this is the provision
forming the crux of the controversy, that:
"The power is hereby given the Trustee
in its sole discretion to advance to the
wife of the Grantor from time to time
such portions of the principal of the said
trust fund as in its judgment may be
necessary for her proper care and support, and the Trustee j n so doing is wholly
protected and shall be liable to no one."
Grantor also reserved the right to amend
or revoke the trust during his lifetime.
The trust was funded in the year 1936,
upon the death of grantor. The principal
received by the trustee was in the sum of
$35,405.32. In addition to the benefits conferred by the trust and also as a result of
the death of her husband, Becky received
83 shares of American Telephone and Telegraph Company stock, the proceeds of life
insurance policies in the sum of $14,000, and
the proceeds of a joint checking account
in the approximate sum of $4,000. The home
in which the couple resided was in the name
of Becky.
The trustee from the year 1936 to 1952
made monthly payments to Becky in
amounts varying from $130 to $200 per
month, which were made up of income and

principal. While there was testimony
the trustee was conversant with Becky's
financial affairs and gave consideration
to such matters during that period, it did
not regard its powers to invade principal
as limited to bare necessities of Becky after
taking into strict account her income from
other sources or to require her to exhaust
or use her own personal estate for purposes of support. Consequently, no special
effort was made to require Becky regularly
to report her income and expenses and to
account for the expenditure of amounts
paid to her by the trustee.
In 1952 Becky married Leonard Boehler. At the time of the marriage Boehler was a man of modest means and because
of physical disability had not been employed
for some time. His only income for the past
several years has been a small social security payment. On the occasion of Becky's
remarriage, Alma Finkbiner made inquiry
of the trustee as to the payments being made
to Becky from the trust. Upon being informed that the trustee had been invading
principal in order to make the monthly payments of $200, Mrs. Finkbiner, through her
attorney, advised the trustee that further
invasion of principal under the circumstances then existing was unwarranted and
was in fact contrary to the provisions of
the trust. In view of the complaint and in
view of the changed circumstances, the
trustee made a reappraisal of the entire
situation. The matter was also referred to
its attorney. Thereafter, the trustee concluded that a monthly payment of $162.50
to Becky from the trust—in part from in-* ^
come and in part from principal—was necessary for her reasonable care and support
and payments in such amount have been
made since that time. Becky did not object.
Mrs. Finkbiner was also advised of the decision by the trustee but took no action before her death in November 1962. For the
period between August 1, 1936 and January
29, 1965, the trustee paid to Becky out of
the principal of the trust approximately
$23,000. Of that amount approximately
$13,500 has been paid since the remarriage
of Becky. The balance of the principal re-
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maining in the trust after making said payments was approximately $12,000.
The action here was commenced in April
1963. In substance, the contentions of
plaintiffs below were that the intention of
the grantor was that the principal* of the
trust was to remain intact for the remaindermen except invasion for amounts necessary for Becky's proper care and support;
that it was not intended that the principal
be used to enhance the value of Becky's
personal estate; that the advances made
by the trustee were not necessary for
Becky's care and support; that because of
the remarriage Becky was not entitled to
further advances; that the trustee had been
cSareless and negligent in the administration of the trust; and that the payments
made from principal by the trustee were
simply "advances" in the nature of loans
"from the trust and had to be restored. The
relief sought was a determination of the
rights of the parties under the trust agreement, an order restraining the trustee from
further invasion of principal, and that the
trustee be required to restore to principal
the funds paid to Becky from that source.
As we understand plaintiffs' brief, this demand has now been modified to embrace
only the payments made subsequent to
Becky's remarriage.
The contentions of the defendants were
that Becky was the primary interest of
grantor in creating the trust; that the trustee had absolute discretion to invade the
principal in such amount as in its judgment
was necessary for Becky's proper care and
support and could be held accountable only
for failure to exercise its discretion in good
faith; that such discretion, is not subject
to control by the court except for abuse;
that '
c' :~g its discretion it need not
consider Becky's other financial means, or
in the alternative that it need only consider
Becky's other income; and that the payOients made to Becky from principal were
Within the trustee's discretion. By their
answer and counterclaim the defendants
Asked that the court determine the rights
•Of the parties in keeping with their conten-

tions and that plaintiffs' claims for relief
be denied.
The trial court in disposing of the matter held that the trust instrument was not
ambiguous and the intention of grantor
could be determined from the four corners
of the instrument; that the trustee did not
have absolute discretion in the invasion of
principal for Becky's care and support; that
Becky was not required to exhaust her personal estate in order to receive payment
of principal; that the trustee before invading principal must take into consideration the other income of Becky and her husband so that payments of principal will not
result in an increase of Becky's personal
estate; that the word ^advance" for purposes of the trust means "pay"; that Becky's
remarriage did not affect her status as the
life beneficiary; tfiat the trustee has not
been negligent in its administration of the
trust, has acted in good faith, and has not
abused its discretion; and that defendants
were not liable to the remaindermen and
neither the trustee nor Becky are required
to reimburse principal. The trial court also
directed the trustee to investigate and redetermine the extent to which the principal should be invaded, taking care that such
payments when added to Becky's other income would sufficiently enable her to maintain her present station in life and yet not
increase the corpus of her personal estate.
On appeal the plaintiffs in substance contend that the judgment of the trial court
was in error except that portion which determined the trustee was required to consider Becky's other income before invading
principal. The defendants in substance contend that the trial court erred in holding
certain extrinsic evidence inadmissible bec use the trust instrument was not ambiguous and in declining to consider other
evidence of surrounding circumstances; in
holding that the trustee's discretion to invade principal for the purpose stated was
not absolute; and in directing the trustee
to exercise its discretion in the manner
above set forth.

From the foregoing it is quite evident
that inquiry into the powers of the trustee is
not only essential, but to a large extent will
dispose of the questions raised on both
appeals.
[1,2] In approaching the question of
interpretation of the clause granting the
power of invasion of the principal, we will
first state that we would like to agree with
the trial court's conclusion that such clause,
when considered v/ith r.thzr provisions of
the trust, was not ambiguous. Unfortunately, we cannot go that far. The great
volume of litigation prompted by clauses
similar to the one here and the struggle
courts have with those clauses in order to
arrive at the intention of the grantor
demonstrate the ambiguity. Usually, the
divergence in results reached can be attributed in a large measure to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
trust. For an informative discussion of
the matter see 2 Scott on Trusts, § 164.1,
pp. 1156-1160 (2d Ed.). Consequently, we
think there is merit in defendants* contention that competent evidence tending to
show surrounding circumstances was admissible and was entitled to consideration.
That is particularly true of grantor's will
executed on the same date as the trust instrument and the codicil thereto executed
in the year 1934. In this connection we
should mention, that the codicil was one
item of evidence which the trial court refused to admit in evidence. Such a ruling,
it seems to us, overlooks the fact that the
trust was not funded at the time the codicil
was executed and the grantor had reserved
the right to amend or revoke the trust at
any time. The codicil was therefore relevant as a part of the overall plan adopted
by John Huckfeldt for disposing of his
property and such plan does have some
significance as an aid to construing the
invasion clause. Nevertheless, we do not
find that the trial court's rulings on these
matters were prejudicial. With one exception, which we shall later mention, we
are of the opinion that the trial court properly disposed of the questions before it

and the exception can be corrected her
without invading the province of the trijj
court as the finder of the facts. Furthei
more, the trial court, as shown by its memc
randum opinion, did give consideration t
the surrounding circumstances in arrivin
at certain of its conclusions.
In meeting the difficult problem of it
terpreting the invasion clause of the trui
in order to arrive at the intention of th
grantor, we have been substantially aide
by the thoroughness with which counsel fc
both parties in their.briefs have present*
and analyzed the authorities in connectio
therewith. As stated by counsel for tl
plaintiffs, the cases, for convenience, ca
be viewed as falling into three generi
classes, namely, (1) those holding that tr
trustee must inquire into the assets ar
resources of the life beneficiary and n
quire that they be exhausted in whole or i
part before payments are made from tl
principal, (2) those holding that the trust<
need consider only the other income of tl
life beneficiary—not his assets, and (I
those holding that the trust was intended :
provide for the needs of the beneficiary ar
was a complete benefaction in itself ai
that the trustee need not inquire into eith<
the assets or income of the life beneficiar
To the three classes mentioned, despi
overlapping, should be added a four
classification, ana it is composed of tho
cases advanced by counsel for the defen
ants interpreting a clause containing la
guage similar to the clause here as vestii
in the trustee an absolute or unlimited di
cretion which is not subject to control 1
the courts except to prevent abuse. Se
eral cases hold that subject to such limit
tion the trustee is free to consider or n
consider a life beneficiary's other financi
means.
While a review of the authorities suppoi
ing the approach taken by the courts in t
four classes of cases enumerated has be
informative, an effort on our part
analyze and reconcile the divergent resu
reached would seem unrewarding. Becau
of the variance in the language of t
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luse being interpreted and the differing
rrounding circumstances present in each
>e, reliance on precedents has its limitans. In re Tuthill's Will, 247 Minn. 122,
N.W.2d 499, 502; and Annotation 2
L.R2d 1383, 1431. Seldom is it possible
itly to package an invasion clause into a
-ticular class and say that it is controlled
some categorical general rule. Cerily that is true of this case, particularly
to the language used. Except as to its
teral tenor, it seems almost unique.
vertheless, we shall proceed as best we
[ to interpret.the clause, keeping in mind
pful and well-recognized rules of coniction.

In re Leonard's Estate, 115 Vt. 440, 63 A.2d
179, 181.

i.

[10] Our first inquiry here can well be
directed to the general purpose John Huckf eldt had in mind in creating the trust As
to this the trial court upon consideration of
the instrument as a whole and the surrounding circumstances, as disclosed by its memorandum opinion, concluded that the primary
purpose was to assure that Becky would be
supported in a "proper manner" without
having to rely solely "upon the income from
this trust and the property he left her."
W e agree with the conclusion, subject to
some refinement. As the trial court observedj the remaindermen were "collateral
relatives" and the "primary object of the
bounty of the settlor*' was hii wife, Becky.
True; there was evidence from which the
trial court might have inferred that because
of a special and friendly relationship existing between the grantor and the remaindermen, the grantor intended that the principal
of the trust be preserved for the remaindermen to the deprivation of liberality on
Becky's behalf, but we cannot say that such
was the only inference to be drawn. Perhaps it was this relationship that prompted
grantor to select his sister or her issue
as residuary beneficiaries rather than to
include his other relatives. In any event,
there was ample evidence to sustain the
view that grantor and Becky had led the
"good life," as the trial court put it, and
that her welfare was his principal concern.
There remains, of course, the question of
the extent to which the principal had been
devoted to Becky, and we think we can
best answer that by next considering the
powers conferred upon the trustee to carry

| It is also a well-recogrnized rule that
irovisions of a husband's will or of a
created by him conferring benefits
his wife are to be construed liberalher behalf. Bradberry v. Anderson,
kla. 681, 200 So. 762, 763; In re WorEstate, supra; Arenofsky v. Arenof9 NJ.Super. 209, 102 A.2d 101, 106;

[11] The invasion clause has heretofore
been set forth in full. Without question it
discloses an intention to grant broad powers
to the trustee. In substance, with emphasis
on the dominant words, it authorizes invasion of principal in the "sole discretion"
of the trustee from "time to time" in such

3-8] A* we have heretofore indicated^
i the intention of the granior that must
em. That is to be ascertained, if poasi~
from the context of the trust instrutt as a whole. Every word is to be given
£t if that can be done without defeating
general purpose of the trust. In re
urn's Estate, Wyo., 406 P 2 d 655, 658.
he intention of the grantor does not
lily appear from the instrument, then
language used is to be read in the light
he surrounding circumstances. In re
lill's Will, supra; In re Worman's
te, 231 Iowa 1351, 4 N.W.2d 373, 374;
ed States Trust Co. of New York v.
s, 414 111. 265, 111 N.E.2d 144, 147A narrow and unreasonable con:tion that would defeat the purpose in*d by the grantor will not be adopted.
) ascertained, the intention must govprovided that the result reached is not
ary to law. In re Ogburn's Estate,
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amounts as in its "judgment may be necessary for her proper care and support" and
in the exercise of such discretion the trustee "shall be liable to no one." No doubt
the clause is not as artfully drawn as it
might have been to avoid pitfalls that have
developed in the law of trusts since 1929.
Nevertheless, it seems apparent that grantor
firmly believed that the trustee, in the exercise of its experience, judgment and discretion, would so administer the trust as to
deal fairly with all the beneficiaries in
carrying out the purpose of the trustee.
Of course, plaintiffs put that aside as a
device prompted by the trustee for its protection, but we think the more reasonable
view is that it was here inserted to encourage untrammeled use of the power.
Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 Colum.L.Rev. 1425.
1433.
Whether we say it was an absolute discretion seems unimportant The grant, in
any event, gave great freedom of action
to the trustee with the qualification that the
law places upon it, which is succinctly
stated in Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 560,
p. 119 (2d Ed.), to be:
" * * * that the trustee shall act with
some regard to the purposes of the trust,
and not make decisions which frustrate
the accomplishment of the settlor's intent; and also that he shall employ his
discretion deliberately and with some
thought and not recklessly or capriciously,
and furthermore in a spirit of good faith
and honesty."
[12] Plaintiffs do not seem particularly
to quarrel with that rule but insist that use
of the words "necessary support" places the
clause in class one above. They rely on
cases such as In re Ferrall's Estate, 41 Cal.
2d 166, 258 P.2d 1009; Guaranty Trust
Company of New York v. New York City
Cancer Committee, 145 Conn. 542, 144 A.2d
535, 537; and In re Martin's Will, 269 N.Y.
305, 199 N.E. 491. For cases to the contrary see Winkel v. Streicher, 365 Mo. 1170,
295 S.W.2d 56, 58-59; In re Clark's Will,

280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E2d 1001, 1002; anc
In re Demitc' Estate, 417 Pa. 316, 20*
A.2d 280, 282. Without indicating our approval or disapproval of the rationale followed in any of these cases, we are disposed to regard plaintiffs' contention aj
advancing a narrow and unreasonable construction. It overlooks the related genera
standard of "proper care" prescribed h\
the grantor, the broad discretion comY—^
upon the trustee, and other pertinent circumstances^
[13] Neither do we think it necessarj
to pass upoa^fe Question of whether or no!
the trustee was compelled to give consid
eration to Becky's other income. The fad
is that the trustee—with the acquiescence
of Beck>—whether as a matter of inter
pretation or as an exercise of discretion
has from the outset given consideration tc
such income and the trial court has founc
from substantial evidence that in so doing
the trustee has not been guilty of negii
gence; h^s exercised good faith; and ha<
not abused its discretion. It also state*
that other than increment there was nc
evidence of capital enhancement of Becky'j
personal estate. We find nothing in th<
record to indicate that the trustee or Beck}
at this late date proposes a change of poliq
in administering the trust, and as a resul
we think the trial court mipht well hav<
declined to enter into this unsettled stat<
of the law, cttn though requested to do so
The real controversy was with the plaintiffs and, as we view it, that controvers)
was sufficiently settled by the foregoing
Consequently, we hold that the trial coun
went too far in directing the trustee to re
appraise tiie situation "so that payments ol
principal will not result in an increase oi
her [Becky's] personal estate." In essence
such a direction fixed the amount of the
payments to be made in the future by ai
illusive standard not imposed upon the
trustee by die grantor. That was a mattei
which the grantor left to the discretion oi
the trustee in the first instance. In re
Grubel's \Y3,37 Misc.2d 910, 235 N.Y.S2d
21, 23.
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[14] Also, we find no merit in plainiffs' contention that the trial court erred
i construing the word "advance" to mean
pay." As the trial court remarked, the
lought that amounts paid to Becky from
rincipal were "repayable" or in the nature
f a "secured loan" would be "repugnant"
> the intention of the grantor. The trial
Wirt's conclusion is well supported by autority. Hichborn v. Bradbury, 111 Me.

519, 90 A. 325; Martin v. Kimball, 86 N.J.
Eq. 10, % A. 565, 566, 568, affirmed 86
NJ.Eq. 432, 99 A. 1070; In re Altman's
Will, Surr., 6 N.Y.S.2d 972.
The judgment is modified insofar as it
undertakes to impose upon the trustee the
change in policy for future administration
of the trust. In all other respects the
judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed as modified.

"'[Ajiihough ordinarily an a^pui-nU'
court will not consider an issue which
has not been raised in the trial court or
which has not been raised by the parties
on appeal, the court does have the power
to do so in exceptional circumstances,
where consideration of the new issue is
necessary to serve the ends of justice or
to prevent a denial of fundamental
rights."
We conclude this case presents exceptional
circumstances and that remand is necessary to serve the ends of justice.
The judgment of the district court is
reversed, and the case is remanded with
directions to set aside the conviction.

*.r\>t iiicufi.u i.>«- upi-iio*! to such expenses.
Widow and her guardian appealed. The
Supreme Court, Herd, J., held that: (1)
testamentary trust provisions were unambiguous, and therefore trial court improperly considered parol evidence in construing
trust provisions; (2) testamentary trust required trustee to pay widow's support,
health, and maintenance for period of her
natural life irrespective of her individual
income; (3) upon death of life beneficiary,
remaindermen, as opposed to life beneficiary- estate, would be entitled to undistributed income; and (4) venue of action to
construe testamentary trust had to be in
county where will was filed for probate, as
opposed to county of trustee's residence.
Reversed and remanded.
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J. Richard GODFREY,
Trustee, Appellee.
v.
Peggy CHANDLEY, an incompetent; and
Sue Moran, Guardian of the Person
and Estate of Peggy Chandley, Appellants,
and
W.T. Chandley; Fay C. Hogle; Martha
Lou Chandley Haddon; Lee Ellen Hogle Morrison; Janis Ann Hogle Robinson; and Linda Fay Hogle, Appellees.
No. 65630.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
May 24, 1991.
Trustee filed declaratory judgment action, seeking interpretation and construction of testamentary trust. The Seward
District Court, Keaton G. Duckworth, J.,
determined that decedent's widow's income
from marital estate had to first be applied
to her cost of living, and only if income
became insufficient to pay reasonable costs
of support, health, and maintenance should

1. Appeal and Error <s=842(8)
Construction of written instrument is
question of law, and therefore instrument
may be construed and its legal effect determined by appellate court.
2. Contracts <£> 176(2)
Whether instrument is ambiguous is
matter of law to be decided by court.
3. Contracts <s=>143(2)
Generally, if language of written instrument is clear and can be carried out as
written, there is no room for rules of construction.
4. Wills <s=*470<2)
Primary function of court in interpretation of will is to ascertain testator's intent as derived from four corners of will.
5. Wills <s=>488
When ambiguity exists in will, parol
evidence is admissible to ascertain meaning
of words used.
6. Trusts <3=>280
Whether trustee can consider personal
income of trust beneficiary when making
distributions is to be determined from language of instrument and surrounding circumstances.
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7. Trusts <3=>273
When trust settlor manifests intention
that trust property be applied to beneficiary s support only if and to extent beneficiary is in actual need, then beneficiary is
not entitled to support from trust fund if
other sufficient resources are available.
8. Trusts <s=>119

When settlor directs trustee to pay
beneficiary so much as is necessary for his
support and maintenance, inference arises
that settlor intended beneficiary to receive
support from trust estate, regardless of
other income.
9. Trusts <3=>119
Trial court should not have used parol
evidence as to testator's intent in construing provisions of testamentary trust, where
trust provisions were unambiguous, and
therefore intent could be ascertained solely
from language of instrument.
10. Wills <S=>684.10(2)
Pursuant to testamentary trust, which
directed that trustee shall pay such portion
of net income from trust as may be necessary for testator's widow's support, health,
and maintenance, trustee had to pay widow
support, health, and maintenance for period
of her natural life irrespective of her individual income, but only for essential items.
11. Wills <®=>687(1)
Whether undistributed trust income
belongs to estate of life beneficiary or remaindermen depends upon intention of testator as manifested in will or other trust
instrument.
12. Wills <^687(1)
\ i-»r -iviith of ::fe beneficiarv under
testamentary trust, remaindermen, as opposed to estate of life beneficiary, would be
entitled to undistributed trust income,
where trust did not state that undistributed
income should be paid to beneficiary's estate, but provided specific direction for sale
of all real estate and personal property
owned by trust estate and remaining upon
beneficiary's death, and will explicitly stated testator's intent to exclude everyone not
designated as trust beneficiary.

13. Wills <s=>698
Venue of action to interpret testamentary trust had to be in county where will
w a s fiied for probate, as opposed to county
o f trustee's residence. K.S.A. 59-1601, 60595
Syllabus by the Court
1. The construction of a written instrument is a question of law, and the
instrument may be construed and its legal
effect determined by an appellate court.
2. Whether an instrument is ambiguous is a matter of law to be decided by the
court. As a general rule, if the language
of a written instrument is clear and can be
carried out as written, there is no room for
rules of construction.
3. The primary function of a court in
the interpretation of a will is to ascertain
the testator's intent as derived from the
four corners of the will. Where an ambiguity exists in the written instrument, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the
meaning of the words used.
4. Under the facts of this case, the
testator's intent can be ascertained solely
from the language of the testamentary
trust. A trust provision which directs the
trustee to pay the net income of the trust
to a named beneficiary as is necessary for
her support, health, and maintenance is not
ambiguous. The trustee shall pay the beneficiary's necessary expenses without consideration of the beneficiary's independent
income.
5. The income of a trust for support
and maintenance shall accumulate in the
trust during the beneficiary's lifetime to
assure adequate resources for lifetime
maintenance.
Upon the beneficiary's
death, however, the unused income shall be
added to the trust principal and distributed
to the remaindermen.
6. Under the provisions of Chapter 59
of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, proper
venue for construction of a testamentary
trust is in the county where the will creating the trust is filed for probate.
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Paul A. Wolf of Brollier, Wolf & Schroeder, Hugoton, argued the cause, and Kim
R. Schroeder of the same firm, was with
him on the brief, for appellants.
Stanley E. Antrim of Yoxall, Antrim &
Yoxall, Liberal, argued the cause and was
on the brief, for appellees.
HERD, Judge:
This case pertains to the construction of
a testamentary trust established by the
decedent Jim Chandley. Chandley died ::.
1986. His will was probated and administered in Stevens County District Court. J.
Richard Godfrey was appointed acting
trustee in accordance with the terms of the
testamentary trust established by Chandley's will.
Chandley devised substantially all of his
property to his wife, Peggy Chandley. Under the terms of a testamentary trust, he
created a life estate for the benefit of
Peggy with the remainder to pass to named
heirs. The trust provision in dispute provides that the net income of the trust shall
be paid to Peggy "as may be necessary for
her support, health and maintenance."
Peggy Chandley resides in a nursing
home in Dallas, Texas. She was declared
incompetent by a Dallas County probate
court, whereupon Sue Ann Walker Moran
was appointed guardian for Peggy and her
estate.
Peggy claims she is the beneficial owner
of the trust income and is entitled to all of
the net income necessary for her support,
health, and maintenance. In addition, she
asserts any income not distributed for her
support, health, and maintenance should be
held by the trustee for future use should
the need arise. Finally, Peggy claims any
undistributed income should be paid to her
estate upon death.
The remaining defendants are beneficiaries under the decedent's trust, subject
to the interests of Peggy. They contend
Peggy is entitled only to trust income for
support, health, and maintenance expenses
which she cannot pay from her own separate income. Upon Peggy's death, the remaindermen claim all undistributed income

should be paid into the trust corpus and
distributed to them.
J. Richard Godfrey, the trustee, filed this
declaratory judgment action in Seward
County District Court seeking an interpretation and construction of the testamentary
trust. A hearing was held in Seward County District Court on May 11, 1990, wherein
the district court judge declined to rule on
the admissibility of parol evidence but accepted a proffer of testimony. This proff
p>* 'Mk-ateri that Jim and Peggy Chandley
disliked each other's relatives and, therefore, evenly divided their marital assets.
The proffered evidence showed that Jim
Chandley intended for the trust income to
be utilized for Peggy's benefit only when
her expenses exceeded the ability to pay
from her own income. A proffer of evidence on Peggy's behalf denied the asserted intention of Jim Chandley.
On August 3, 1990, the district court
ruled the trust provisions were unambiguous and the proffered testimony inadmissible. The court determined Peggy's income from the marital estate must first be
applied to her cost of living, and only if the
income became insufficient to pay the reasonable costs of support, health, and maintenance should the trust income be applied
to these expenses. Peggy appeals.
I
The first issue we consider is whether
Peggy Chandley, the life tenant under the
provisions of Jim Chandley's testamentary
trust, is entitled to all or a portion of the
trust income for her support, health, and
maintenance without regard to her personal income.
[1-3] The construction of a written instrument is a question of law, and the
instrument may be construed and its legal
effect determined by an appellate court.
Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc. v. Anadarko
Prod. Co., 243 Kan. 130, 133, 754 P.2d 803
(1988). Whether an instrument is ambiguous is a matter of law to be decided by the
court. Mobile Acres, Inc. v. Kurata, 211
Kan. 833, 839, 508 P.2d 889 (1973). As a
general rule, if the language of a written
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instrument is clear and can be carried out
as written, there is no room for rules of
construction. In re Living Trust of Huxtable, 243 Kan. 531, 534, 757 P.2d 1262
(1988).
[4,5] The primary function of a court in
the interpretation of a will is to ascertain
the testator's intent as derived from the
four corners of the will. Drack v. Ely, 237
Kan. 654, 656, 703 P.2d 746 (1985). Where
an ambiguity exists in the written instrument, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the meaning of the words used. In re
Living Trust ofHuxtable, 243 Kan. at 533,
757 P.2d 1262.
Let us now turn to the trust provisions
at issue. Paragraph VI of Jim Chandley's
will provides:
"I give, devise, and bequeath the rest
and residue of my estate at the time of
final settlement to J. RICHARD GODFREY AND HIS SUCCESSORS, in trust
and upon trust, without bond or other
security of any kind, to hold and administer the same for the following uses and
upon the following terms and conditions,
without order or authority from any
Court or person.
"A. The trust estate shall be primarily held and administered for the benefit
of my wife, PEGGY CHANDLEY, for
and during her natural life, with remainder to be converted into cash and the net
proceeds divided as hereinafter provided.
"B. The main purpose of the trust is
to provide for the support, health and
maintenance of my wife, PEGGY
CHANDLEY, during her lifetime. The
trust estate shall pay, monthly or at such
intervals as may be agreed upon by the
Trustee and my Wife, during the period
of the trust such portion of the net income from the trust as may be necessary
for her support, health, and maintenance.
There shall be no invasion of principal."
Peggy urges a broad and liberal construction of the trust provisions so that the
trustee must pay to Peggy the sums needed or desired by her for support, health,
and maintenance. She also contends undistributed trust income should be retained by
the trustee to provide for subsequent sup-

port and any remaining income upon her
death shall be paid to her estate.
The remaindermen assert the words "primarily" and "necessary" are words of limitation which indicate that Jim Chandley
intended the trust to pay only those expenses which exceeded Peggy's personal
income. The remaindermen argue that,
where Peggy's income is available and sufficient to pay her living costs, the expenses
are not necessary and, therefore, should
not be paid from the trust income.
[6-8] Whether a trustee can consider
the personal income of a trust beneficiary
is to be determined from the language of
the instrument and surrounding circumstances. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
§ 811, p. 229 (rev. 2d ed. 1981). Where the
trust settlor manifests an intention that the
trust property be applied to the beneficiary's support only if and to the extent the
beneficiary is in actual need, then the beneficiary is not entitled to support from the
trust fund if other sufficient resources are
available.* See Dunklee v. Kettering, 123
Colo. 43, 46, 225 P.2d 853 (1950); First
National Bank of Catawba County v.
Edens. 55 N.C.App. 697, 704, 286 S.E.2d
818 (1982). See generally 2 Scott on Trusts
§ 128.4 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1987). On the
other hand, where a settlor directs the
trustee to pay the beneficiary so much as is
necessary for support and maintenance, an
inference arises that the settlor intended
the beneficiary to receive support from the
trust estate, regardless of other income.
See Taylor v. Hutchinson, 17 Ariz.App.
301, 304-05, 497 P.2d 527 (1972); Estate of
Wells v. Sanford, Trustee, 281 Ark. 242,
246-47, 663 S.W.2d 174 (1984); Hamilton
Nat Bank v. Childers, 233 Ga. 427, 428,
211 S.E.2d 723 '1975); In re Coats Trust.
581 S.W.2d 392. 393-96 (MoApp.1979); see
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 128, comment e (1957).
In Blair v. Blair, 82 Kan. 464, 108 Pac.
827 (1910), the testator directed his executors to pay to his wife, out of the net
proceeds of his business and estate earnings, such amounts necessary for her support and maintenance, and any excess earnings were to be reinvested in the estate.
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The widow claimed she was entitled to all
the net income to use without restraint
This court determined the words "support
and maintenance" were used in a broad and
liberal manner. The court examined the
language of the will and found the testator
intended for his wife to have all the income,
if necessary, for her support and maintenance but did not provide her with a means
to engage in any enterprise or business.
82 Kan. at 467. 108 Pac. 827.
The testator in Dunklee v. Kettering,
123 Colo, at 44, 225 P.2d 853, directed the
trustee to pay the entire trust income to
her husband and authorized the trustee to
use the principal and or income "as may be
necessary to provide him with the necessities of life." The court considered evidence
which showed that the husband possessed
a large income from his practice of medicine and ownership of a medical clinic. 123
Colo, at 45, 225 P.2d 853. The Colorado
court then determined that the phrase
"necessities of life" was limited by the
term "as may be necessary" and found
that in light of the beneficiary's financial
situation it was not necessary for the trustee to provide for the beneficiary's necessities of life from the trust corpus. 123
Colo, at 46, 225 P.2d 853.
In First National Bank of Catawba
County v, Edens, 55 N.CApp. 697, 286
S.E.2d 818, an incompetent son was the
beneficiary of his mother's testamentary
trust. The beneficiary had already received a share of his father's estate, and,
under the provisions of the beneficiary's
mother's trust, the trustee was to use the
income and principal, in his discretion, as
necessary for the support, maintenance,
and comfort of the beneficiary. The trust
specifically directed the trustee to consider
the beneficiary's needs and the amount of
income received from the father's estate.
55 N.CApp. at 698, 286 S.E.2d 818. The
North Carolina court found no error in the
trustee's consideration of the beneficiary's
personal income because the trust directed
the trustee to pay in the trustee's discretion, even if the beneficiary's personal income was insufficient to cover his living
expenses. 55 N.CApp. at 701-02, 286
S.E.2d 818.

In Estate of Wells v. Sanford, Trustee,
281 Ark. 242, 663 S.WAI 174, a son bequeathed his entire estate for the benefit of
his incompetent mother. The trust directed the trustee to "expend for the support
and maintenance of the [mother] such sums
as may be necessary as long as she lives."
The trust beneficiary owned 109 acres of
realty and had a life interest in 80 acres;
however, she also owed $23,749.74 to the
nursing home where she resided. 281 Ark.
at 244-45, 663 S.W.2d 174. A petition was
filed to sell the trust assets to provide for
the beneficiary's support, but the petition
was denied by the trial court, which found
the beneficiary must first apply her own
income to her support. The Arkansas Supreme Court studied the language of the
trust instrument and determined the words
"necessary for support" meant the trust
was intended to be used to support the
beneficiary, regardless of the beneficiary's
own assets. 281 Ark. at 246-47, 663
S.W.2d 174.
The same conclusion was reached in
Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Childers, 233 Ga.
427, 211 S.E.2d 723, wherein the testator
directed the trustee to pay, at his discretion, the trust proceeds to his wife necessary for her to maintain the same standard
of living to which she was accustomed.
The Georgia court found it is ordinarily
presumed the testator intended the beneficiary to be supported by the trust fund so
that the beneficiary's other income and assets were not to be considered. Thus, the
trustee's discretionary power did not include authorization to consider the beneficiary's private income. 233 Ga. at 428, 211
S.E.2d 723.
In the present case, we examine the language of the testamentary trust to ascertain Jim Chandley's intent in establishing
the trust. Subsection A of paragraph VI
states that the trust estate shall be primarily held and administered for the benefit of
Peggy Chandley, for life, with the remainder divided among named remaindermen.
Subsection B states the purpose of the
trust is to provide for the support, health,
and maintenance of Peggy Chandley during her lifetime. The trust provision then
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directs that the trustee shall pay such portion of the net income from the trust as
may be necessary for Peggy's support,
health, and maintenance.
In Schaufv. Thomas, 209 Kan. 592, 498
P.2d 256 (1972), the beneficiary of a testamentary trust for support and maintenance
brought an action to recover accumulated
income in a trust. The trust directed the
trustee to use as much of the principal of
the estate as may be necessary to provide
for the care, maintenance, and support of
the plaintiff. For a time, all the trust
income was paid into plaintiffs account;
however, after a while the trustee paid
most of the trust income into the trust
account. The trial court found the will was
not ambiguous and, therefore, parol evidence was not necessary. The trial court
ruled the testatrix intended the trustee to
disburse to the plaintiff the income and
principal necessary to provide the plaintiff
with the comforts available when the trust
was created, and found the trustee could
consider funds available to the plaintiff
from other sources. 209 Kan. at 597, 498
P.2d 256.
Upon review, this court ruled that extrinsic evidence which showed the testatrix's
situation when the will was executed, the
nature of the business, the extent of the
property, and the relationship with the beneficiaries was admissible to clarify the language of the will, but not to change the
will. 209 Kan. at 599, 498 P.2d 256. The
court then considered evidence surrounding
the establishment of the trust estate and
found the testatrix intended to treat all
daughters equally, with the remainder interest in certain land to be used for the
plaintiffs benefit. 209 Kan. at 600, 498
P.2d 256. By placing itself as nearly as
possible in the situation of the testatrix
when :>ne executed the will, tins court determined the testatrix intended the plaintiff
to be entitled to all the trust income and as
much of the principal as necessary for her
support, health, and maintenance. 209
Kan. at 603, 498 P.2d 256.
The trial court in the present case stated
the will was unambiguous and then construed the testamentary trust provision to

give effect to the testator's intent by relying upon proffered testimony that Jim and
Peggy divided their marital assets to pre
vent each other's relatives from benefiting.
In reaching the conclusion that Peggy's
personal income must be depleted before
the trust income could be paid for her
support, health, and maintenance costs, the
district court stated: "To achieve the aim
of the parties manifested by earlier division
of the marital estate in presumably equal
shares and to assure support for both marital partners I find the disputed language to
require payment from the trust for necessary support." Thus, the trial court considered some of the proffered testimony to
ascertain the testator's intent
[9,10] Jim Chandley's intent can be
ascertained solely from the language of the
instrument It is unambiguous, as the trial
court determined. Therefore, the trial
court should not have used the proffered
evidence in construing the trust provisions.
We hold the trustee shall pay Peggy support, health, and maintenance for the period of her natural life irrespective of her
individual income. The testator obviously
intended to provide maintenance for his
wife for her life. His provision is limited
only by what is necessary. In other words,
it cannot be used to provide nonessential
items.
[11] Now let us consider the disposition
of the undistributed income. Whether it
belongs to the estate of the life beneficiary
or to the remaindermen depends upon the
intention of the testator as manifested in
the will or other trust instrument 51 Am.
Jur.2d, Life Tenants and Remaindermen
§ 108.
In Calkin v. Wallace, 160 Kan. 760, 165
P.2d 224 (1946), this court considered
whether a trust beneficiary's estate or the
surviving trust beneficiaries were entitled
to payment of undistributed trust income.
We found the trust was created for the
sole benefit of the named beneficiaries during their natural lives and did not state any
portion of the income should be paid to the
beneficiary's estate. The court concluded
the testator did not intend for the income
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to be paid to the beneficiary s estate. 160
Kan. at 765, 165 P.2d 224.
[12] We reach a similar conclusion in
this case. The trust does not state the
undistributed income should be paid to Peggy's estate, but provides specific direction
for the sale of all real estate and personal
property owned by the trust estate and
remaining upon Peggy's death. In addition, the will explicitly states the testator's
intent to exclude everyone not designated
as a trust beneficiary Therefore, allowing
the trust income to pass to Peggy's estate
would violate the intention of Jim's will.
Thus, we reject Peggy's claim for such a
construction of Jim's trust and will, but
hold that the unused trust income shall be
accumulated in the trust during Peggy's
lifetime to assure adequate resources for
her lifetime maintenance. At her death,
the unused income shall be added to the
trust principal and distributed to the remaindermen.

in this ease Peggy is a resident of Dallas, Texas, and the trustee is a resident of
Seward County, Kansas. Thus, the trustee
determined K.S.A.1990 Supp. 60-605 applied and filed this action in Seward County. The district court ruled venue was in
Seward County. We disagree. Chapter 59
of the Kansas Statutes Annotated establishes the venue of the proceeding to probate a will creating a testamentary trust
and where the accountings shall be filed.
We hold that the venue for actions to construe such a trust is m the county where
the will is filed for probate. We order that
this case be transferred to Stevens County
District Court and that an order be entered
therein in this case consistent with this
opinion.
The judgment of the district court is
reversed and this case is remanded for
further proceedings.

(O

II
[13] Peggy next contends Seward
County District Court was an improper
venue for an action to interpret the testamentary trust. She asserts venue was
proper in Stevens County District Court,
where the will was probated and the trustee appointed. For support, she relies upon
K.S.A. 59-1601, which requires a testamentary trustee to file an inventory and make
accountings of trust property in the district
court where the will was admitted to probate.
Peggy concedes Stevens and Seward
Counties are in the same judicial district
with the same district judges. She contends the trustee filed this action in Seward
County for his own convenience and without concern for the beneficiaries. Finally,
Peggy alleges it is a violation of the probate code to allow the trustee to choose the
venue for this type of action.
K.S.A.1990 Supp. 60-605 provides: "An
action against a nonresident of this state
. . . other than an action for which venue is
otherwise specifically prescribed by law,
may be brought in the county in which: (1)
The plaintiff resides
"
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brought On recommendation of Disciplinary Administrator, the Supreme Court
held that failure to communicate with
client, representation of client while under
suspension, and failure to cooperate with
Disciplinary Administrator in investigation
of complaint warrant indefinite suspension.
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